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~'Ir;

State of Idaho

)

County of Ada

) ss:
)

Matthew o. Pappas, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

That the statements contained herein are your Affiant's own personal
mind and are true and correct to the best of his information.

2.

That your Affiant is an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the
state of Idaho and is a member of the law firm of Anderson, Julian &
Hull LLP, attorneys for Defendants in the above-entitled action.

3.

That attached hereto is Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of
correspondence from Dr. Craig Beaver dated July 20, 2007,
expressing his concerns about the presence of a third party observer
during a neuropsychological exam.
FURTHER your Affiant saith naught.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to

otary Public for Idaho ~'
Residing a.t ~oise, Id.aho
(.
My CommIssIon ExpIres:
I 1/

if

de

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW O. PAPPAS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO I.C. §§ 72-433 AND 72-434 - 2

""'-"

CERTIFICATE ~~ERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of August, 2007, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW O.
PAPPAS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO I.C. §§ 72433 AND 72-434 by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated
below, addressed as follows:

R. Brad Masingill
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone: (208) 414-0665
Facsimile: (208) 414-0490
Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A.
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Telephone: (208) 938-5584
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482

[~U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[]

[J

[~

Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

( /U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[]
Hand-Delivered
[]
Overnight Mail
[....}/' Facsimile

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW O. PAPPAS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO I.C. §§ 72-433 AND 72-434 - 3

Cr aig W. Beaver, Ph.D., ABPP - eN
Licensed Psychologist

250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 220 • Boise~ Idaho 83706 • (208) 336-2972 • Fax (208) 336·4408
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 5445 • Boise, Idaho 83705

July 30; 2007
Matthew O. Pappas
Anderson, Julian & Hull. LLP
250 ~ollth Fl fl.h Street, Ste. 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
RE:

IME of Lesia J. Knowlton

Dear Mr. Pappas:
This letter is in rosponse to your inquiry about Ms. Knowlton·s attorney attending the scheduled
neuropsychological !ME of Ms. Knowlton on August 23 and 24 0[2007. First of all, I have no
objection to her attorney. Mr. Troupis, audiotape recording both the interview and testing. Also,
Mr. Troupis is certainly welcome to wait in our waiting room while Ms. Knowlton is interviewed
and undergoes testing so if she has any questions or concerns and wishes to consult with her
attorney, he could be readily available. The same would also be lru~ if she requested to be able
to contact him during the evaluation via cell phone.
However, there is research that shows having the presence of a third party observer, such as an
attorney. disrupts the evaluation process. In fact, there are both ethical concerns about having a
thiTd [ler~onJobserver present, particularly during the testing, as well as issues of it affc:xling both
rapport and test performance. Therefore) again, while audiotape recording is certainly
reasonable and not particularly intrusive, having a third party present in the examination room is
disruptive with a number of other concerns . .I have included an article from 1998 that outlines
some of those concerns. These concerns are still present today.

If you have questions or need for further clarification regarding these issues. please do not
hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely.

c21 aifdJ.J!?LtliJ-0L~.

Craig w. v.:.V:;PhD, Anpp

Diplomate in Clinical Neuropsychology
CWB:je
ene.

Diplomate in Clinical Neu.-opsychology, American Board of ProfeSSional Psychology
1 :.... "..,..,. _ _
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The Clinil;uJ NeuropsYChologist

1998. Vol. 12. No.4. pp. 552-559

THE ETHICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGIST
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Ethical Issues Related to the Presence of Third Party
Observers in Clinical Neuropsychological Evaluations:t'
A. John McSweenyJ, Bruce C. Becker. Richard 1. Naugle), William O. Snow
6
Lnurcl1ce M. BindeF. and Lae[itia L. Thompson

4

•

IMedical College of Ohio. Toledo. OH. ~Bethesda. MD, 'Cleveland Clinic Foundation. Cleveland. OH.
·'Toronto. ON. SBeaverton. OR. and 6UniveThity of Colorado Medicnl Center. Denver. CO

ABSTRACT
The presence of third parties during neurop~ychological examinations has long been permitlcd fo~ trainin£
or assisting examiners. Recently. clinical ~UJ'oPGychologi$t:J have been requested to allow thmi party
ou~c=rvers who are working in the interest of parties in legal disputes. This paper examines the ethical
implications of the use of third party ()bservcr~ and makes recommcnd:.ltions a.~ to how clinical
neurop$ychologists might handle requests for their presence.

Clinical neuropsycho}ogists are more frequently
encountering ~itU;ttions in whi~h the presence of
a third party is requested (or demanded), most
often in the context of a forensic evaluation.
This pa.f\E."r is offen;d in [htl interest of informing
clinical neuropsychologists and others of the
ethical implications of third party observerS at
neuropsychological evuluations. The paper grew
our of discussions at meetings of the Division 40
Ethics Commirree and may be considered to be
the product of idea:; presented by Conunittee
members. However. it is not an official position
statement of Division 40 or its Ethics Committe!'..
Background
Third po.rty participants in psychological aSSess-

ments have been commonly pennitted for many

years for purposes of training supervisioll. That
is. a supervisor may llccompany :l student when
the student is conducting an evaluation. In this
situation the pre~ence of the superv isor is seen
as helpful to both the patient and the student.
Similarly, the presence of a third party in the
fottn oftranslarnr m;lY be indicatcd when a nonEnglish-speaking per~on is being evaluated.
(The evaluarion of non-English-speaking persons present~ a \fru'iety of ethkal and technical
challenges that are beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is advised to consult Artiola I
Fortuny and Mullaney (1998) for an extended
discussion.) 1n some: but not all. cases. the presence of a parent may have a calming effect and
thllS petmit a more vnlid assessment of an anxious child. In a somewhat unusual twist on this
latter situation. one of the authors (AIM) found

• Til,; authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of past and present Division 4(\ Ethics Committee member!: who, in addition to the authors. partici~lcd in the discussions which ted to the preparution of this article:
Lydia Artiola I rortuny. Wiley Mittcnberg. Anne M. Schneider. and Mdvirt L. Schwllrtl.. The authors also wish
to thank M. Frank Greiffcnsteiu for his assistance in providing several affidavits related to the issues in this
article.
Address correspondence to : A. John McSween),. Depunment of Psychiatry. Medical CoHee" of Ohio. Richu.xLl
Ruppert Healtb Comer, 3120 Glendale AVcnllc. Toledo, OR 43614-58U!1. USA. E-mnil; jmcsweeny@mco.edu.
Accepted ror publication: September 2.1998 .
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ETHICAL ISSUES RELATED TO THIRD PARTY OBSERVERS
Lh<lt u somewhat confused. suspicious, and noncooperntive patient who was being evaluated in
reference to criminal charges against him, performed considerably better and was much more
cooperative when his defense attorney MiS aLlowed to observe the evaluation through a oneway window, even though the attorney had explained to the patient in advance that the evalualion was requested on his behalf.
The practice of allowing [hird pany observers
appears to be in contradiction to the Standards
for Educarional and Psychological Tesrs (American Psychological Association, 1985) which
indicates thllt "In typical applications test administrators should follow carefully the standardized proccdures for administration and scoring by the test publisher ... (Standard 15.1)".
and "The tes[ing environment should be one of
reasonable comfort with minimal distractions ....
(Standard 15.2)" The presence of a third party
observer may violate the standardized procedures specified by the test publisher, and may
cause more than minimal disrraction for the subject. Limited empirical data exist on the e.ffect of
such an observer on the examinee, and whether
that effect is differcnt when the observer is a
lawyer, Mother neuropsychologist. or· another
professic.)nal such as :a nume, paralegal. or a family member. The effect of these various observers on the examiner's hehaviol' also is unknown
and is deserving of empirical study.
In extreme and probably rare situations. an
observer may overtly :md intentionally intcrlcre
in an examination. Even when the observer does
not interfere. his or her mere presence during a
neuropsychological examination may affect lhe
results of the assessment. Third parties may represent a distraction or may provide an incentive
for improved perfon-n:mce llS cvidcn.. ed by sodal facilitation research (McCaffery, Fisher,
Gold, & Lynch, 1996). A Case study using an AR-A-B design by Bin de. and Johnson-Greene
(1995) demonstrated that the presence of an
adult patient's mother negatively affected the
patient'~ performance ou a task commonly used
to detect malingering.
Although the use of supervisors and translatOrS may raise SOUlt: technical questions concerning the validity of the ex:amination. their use
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has not resulted in as much controversy as is the
case when the ethical principles and practice
standards of clinical neuropsychologil:tl: have
come into conflict with standards and practices
within the legal profession during forensic evaluations. The most common scenario for third
party observers is that in which a clinical neuropsycholosist has agreed to provide an indep~n
dent evaluation of a plaintiff in !1 person~l injury
suit at the request of the defense nnorney. In
these cases. the plaintiff's attorney may request
that his or her eXfll':rt witness or other observe.
be present during the evaluation, presumably to
ensure that the evaluation is properly conducted
and accllt:llely reported. The observer may be itll
attorney, a clinical neuropsychologist or psychologist, a legal paraprofessional. nur!\e, or
other type of helllth professionaL
Legal Status of Third Party Observers
McCaffery et Ill. (1996) provided a detailed
analysis of the legal ramifications of third party
observers and discussed the implications of the
presence of third panics on the validity ot" neuropsychological evaluations. Accordingly, legal
issues will only be discussed briefly in this paper.

When presented with a request to allow a
third party observer during an examination by a
plaintiff's attorney, the defense attorney will
often object, arguing that such observation was
not permitted during the plaintiff's original eva!uillion, and if there is any advantage to be
gained by such observation. it should have been
offered to both parties. In addition. the defense
attorney may present the objections of the neuropsychological examiner. including the posi[ion that the presence of a third party observer
potentially interleres with the valid administration of standardized tests and distorts the results
in ways which are not known because they have
not been researched.
It is apparent that judges have a good deal of
latitude in determining whether or not thlrd
party observers should be allowed and that the
legal status of third party observers in clinical
neuropsychological evaluations continues to
evolve. A recent Federal Court decision (Ragge
v. MeA/Universal Studios, 1995) is panicularly

554
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relevant . The plaintiff's Ilttorney requc::;led [hat
a third party observer be present during the psychological examination of the plaintiff condllCT~cI at the request of the defen:;c attorney. In
addition. the plaintiff s attorney asked that the
psychologist disclose the tests to be administ(!l'ed in advance. The psychologist and the defense attorney objected to the conditions specified by the plaintiffs attorney. The Coutt ruled
in f;lVor of the do:fem;c noting that "Third party
observers may, regardless of their good intentions, contaminate a mental examination" and
that "thc potcnti"l for a third party observer to
interfere with, or even contaminate, a mental
examination, is recognized in California Code of
Civil I'roced\.lre Section 2032(g)(I), which provides that an observer may be present at a physical examination but does not provide for an observer al i:I memal examination:' The Court also
concluded that the psychologist did not intend to
use "unorthodox or potentia.lly harmful techniqu~~ in his t:xat(unation of plaintiff. requiring
that a third party be present". and bec:wse
"nothing unusual or improper W:\S proposed"
there was no reason to require thalthe psychologist disclose the tests he planned to use in advance. Whereas the decisions of this fedel":'Il
COl1rt are not binding or relevant in other jurisdictions, they can be cited in legal arguments. ln
addition, the decisions provide legal support for
conducting psychological evaluations in a standard manner in forensic situations.

Association (1992) do not address the is~ue
third party observers directly. However. seve)
of the General Principles and Ethical Standa
have relevance lind are listed below.

General Principles

There are six General Principles: (A) Comp
tence, (B) Integrity, (C) Professional and $cie

Etbical Principles and Standards Applying
to Third Party Observers in Forensic Situa-

tions
A clinical neuropsychologist may be asked to
perform'an evaluation in which a third party observer is to be present or he or she may be asked
to serve as a third party observer in an examination conducted by another neuropsychologist In
the first situation, the neuropsychologisl must
decide whether it is ethica.l to proceed with the
evaluation in which a third party observer is
present. In the lanes llitu:ltion. tho: n~uropsycbol
ogist must decide whether or not he or she
should agree to serve as an observer.
The EthiMI Principles of f'yychologists and
Code of Conduct of the American Psychological

, _ .... _ _ _

f"'T1'
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tine Responsibihry.

(n) Respect for Pcopl

Rights and Dignity, (E) Concern for Othe
Welfare. and (F) Social Responsibility. T
General Principle~ Me intended to be a:;p
alional rather than enforceable. General Prin
ples A, B, C, E, and F appear to have particu
relevance to the: issue of third party \.lbserver
Principle A states, in part "In those area.s
which recognized professional standards do
yet exi!lt. psycho\ogi,ts c"crci:;e carefUl Jud
ment and take appropriato precautions to prot
the welfare of those with whom they work_ Th
maintl'lin knowledge of Idcvant scientific a
professional information related to the servi
they render. _." If one recognizes that the pr
~nce of third pArties is an emplfical issue tha
as yet unresolved, and accepts the responsibi
that a third party's presence could have a l\e
tivc impact VII testing, the neuropsycholog
should consider how observing might affect
patient. Tho neuropsychologist who conside
Ob3cfving another's examination bas the obli
tion to consider the effects of such observati
nOt just on the patient's performance. but a
on the types Of advice he or she is obligated
provide to the lawyer who asks for the obser
tion of the patient's performance. For examp
a reasonable neuropsychologist might inform
lawyer thLlt although be or she does not beli
that the presence of an observer would aff
testing, other psychologists would likely d
agree.
Principle B indicates that psychologists p
mOle integrity in the practice of psycholo
This would imply that psychologistS sho
prOlctice in a fashion that ~voids threi.\lS to
validity of their results. If the presence of a th
pa.rty observer can have a negative effect on
validity of the ex:\mination. it may be seen
inconsistent with the Principle of Integrity.
addition, PrinCiple B notes that psychologi

8
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"attempt to cladfy [or relevant parties the roles

they are perfonning and to function in accordance with those role!;". Thus. if a ncuropsychQIQgist i~ to serve as a lhlrd party observer.
the neurop~ychologist should take care to precisely define his or her role with both attomeys.
the oth.:r neuropsychologist involved, and the
person to be examined. in advance of the examination. The neurop!lychologist, for example.
shvulu l:onsider whether there is any set of circumstances that might warrant intervening in rhe
assessment (e.g .. if it was thought that the palit:lll was abused by the nAture of the interaction
with the assessing neuropsychologist),and comr'nunicme this clearly, il'l advance. to all COnl:cmed.
Principle B also indicates that "Psychologists
avoid improper nnd potentially hannful dual
relationShips ". Un occasion, a neuropsycholo~
gist who has Msessed the patient in the past for
reasons other than forensic purposes (e.g .• while
the patient was in the hospital) or who has had a
treating relationship with the patient may be
asked to serve in the role of observer. The
neuropsychologist who has a clinical relationship should give due consideration to the problems that may arise in the context of engaging in
the role of' forensic; psychologist. If the clinician
becomes involved with forensic tasks. the therapeutic role may be adversely affected. The patient may perceive the clinician as someone who
might provide support or SOlutions for compensating for the effects of an injury and/or overcoming a disability. The patient may perceive a
forensic ex:pert as someone who will document
the c;ltistence of symptoms and disnhi lily, Inevitably. acting as an observer of a forensic examination will move the Ileurop~ychologist into a
forensic role.
Principle C instructs psychologists to "clarify
their professional roles and obligations" as well
as to "accept appropriate r~spom.ibility for thcir
behavior" . Therefore. even if a judge or both
attomeys agree to an evaluation with a third
patty observer present. thl!) neuropsychologist
must make the final decision as to whether he or
she will act in that capacity.

80vv-9E:E:f802)
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Principle E advises that '·When conflicts ocamong psychologists' obligations or conCl'!m.s. thev tl.uelllpllo resolve these conflkts and
perform their roles in a responsible fashion thnt
avoids or minimizes harm". Although Principle
E does not provide Advice for specific: actions to
ta~e. it docs set a general tone for resolving conflicts.
Principle F has several a..<tpeC:IS that apply to
forensic situations in general and. by extension.
to the issue of third patty observers. First. it suggests that " Psychologist~ ar~ aware of their professional and scientific responsibilities to the
community and the society in which they work
and live" including hy ~~tet\!lion. the legal sy$~
tern. Second. it advises that "psychologists try
to avoid misuse of their work" including. presumably. by attOfT\I'!YS. Thus. if sorving as iI thi,.d
party observer at the request of an attorney is
unethical. the neuropsychologist has the responsibility for l'~,(',ogni:zins this fact and for refusing
the attorney's request. Finally, Principle F states
"Psychologists comply with the law and encotlrnge the development of law and social pOI~
icy that serve the interestS of their patients and
clients and tho public". Thus, neuropsychologlsts should not merely be ~ontclll with the status quo in the legal system but should attempt to
improve it. In some respects. the current paper is
offered in the spirit of this prinCiple.
CUT

Ethical Standards
Thore are eight categol'ic~ of Ethical Standards;
(1) General Standards. (2) Evaluation. Assess-

ment or Intervention. (3) Advenising and other
Public Statement, (4) Therapy. (:i) Privacy and

Confidentiality, (6) Training. Training Supervision Research and Publishing. (7) Forensic Activities, 1ll1d (8) Resolving Ethical Issues. In con~
rrast to the General Principles. the Standards are
considered to be enforceable. Thus. they represellllllinimum standards of conduct for psychologists. In this paper. we limit our review to !!tandards in categories 1,2,5 and 7. because these
have particular relevance to the issue of third
party observers. although there may be others
that are relevant.
1.02 Reltlrionship of Erhics and the Law: "If
psychologists' ethical responsibilities conflict

A. JOHN MCSWBENY eT AL.
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with the law. psychologists make known their
commitment to the Erhic;s Code and take steps to
resolve the conflict in a tl".sponS:ible manner".
Comment. This principle echos in a somewhat
more specific way the sentiments expressed in
Principle E. Essentially. it indicntes that when a
psychologist finds that what slhe is requested to
do by the legal sy~tem is in conflict with the
Ethics Code. s/he i~ oblig!lted to act in a proactive manner to resolve the conflict. As Canler et
al. (1994) point out. doing nothing when one is
aware of a legallt':thical conflict may be an ethical violation. Accordingly, if one believes that
serving as a third pan)' observer or allowing a
third PartY oh:c:,t':Tver to be pre3cnt during it neuropsychological evaluation represents an ethical
conflict, the psychologist should take action to
infonn the rl'\levant partic3 of this I;UUtlict anel
hislhcr commiunem to the Ethics Code. Thi~
may be done orally or in writing. as the situation
require~ .

1.03 Professional and Scientific Relationship:
"Psychologists provide diagnostic, therapeutic.
reaching. re!:earch, supervisvry, consultative, or
other psychological services only in the context
of a defined professional or scientific relationship l'Ir role". (Sec comments following Standard 2.01(a) below.)
1.15 Misuse of PsychologisTS' Influence
"PsycholoZist3 nre alert to and guard against ...
factors that might lead to misuse of their influence".
Comment. A neuropsychologist who acts as
an observer may, in his or her own mind, be
playing a useful role in the forensic context, but
should also k~p in mind that the lawyer may be
more interested in the neuropsychologist as a
"weapon" than as a professional.
1.16(a) Misuse a/Psychologists' Work "Psychologists do not participate in activities in
which it appears likely that their skills or data
will be misused by others. unless corrective
mechanisms are available".
Comment. If a neuropsychologist choose~ to
:se,ve as a third party observer, he or she beaTS
the responsibility for preventing the misuse of
his or her expertise. For example. this reJlpon$i.
bilily may not be transferred to the requesting
attorney.

1.17( b) Multiple Relationships "Whenever
feasible, a psychologist refmins from taking on
profc:;:;ionlll or scientitic obligations when preexisting relationships would create a risk of such
harm".
Comment. Should a neuropsychologist, who
hall done an assessment for the parientJ's-lawyer
or has provided the lawyer with a report, engage
in being an observer as well? It might be argued
that the neuropsychologist who engages in providing an opinion for tbe patient's lawyer runs
the nslc of becoming an advocate rather than an
expert.
2.01 (a) Evaluations. Diagnosis. alld [n/erventions in Professional Collte,n: "Psychologists
perfonn evaluations, diagnosis, and interventions only within tbe context of a definr:o professional relationship".
Comment Standard 2.0 I (a) iterates 1.03 with
a specific reference to the clinic~l situation.
Some psychologists might argue that serving as
a third party observer is not consistent with a
"defined professional or Jlcientifie l'elntion$hip
or role". However, we do not believe that 1.03
and 2.01(a) were designed to Testrict psychologists to traditional prllctic£!s. On rhc other hand.
it is important to define the parnmeters of one's
role as a third party observer nnd inform nil the
other parties involved, especinHy given the nontraditional nature of this practice.
2.0J( b): "Psychologists' assessments,recommendations. rr:ports. and p$ycholoc;ical diagnostic or evaluative statements aTe based on information and techniques (including pel'SQoal interviews <If the individual wheu appropriate) sufficient to provide appropriate substantiation for
their findings" .
Comment. Standard 2.0 1 (b) simply indicates
that psychologists should use assessment techniques that will allow them to substantiate the
conclusions that they reach . To the extent that
the presence of a third party observer alters the
testing situation, the ability to substantiate the
examiner's cOllduslons ~uners.
2.02( a) Comp~tence and Appropriau Use of
Assessmenrs (lnd Interventions: "Psychologists
who develop, administer, score, interpret, or use
psychologiCAl assessment techniques, interviews. tests, or instruments do'so in"a manner
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and for purpuses that. arfl appropriate in light of
the research on or evidence of the usefulness
and proper application of the techniques" .
CommenT. Standard 2.02(a) is pnrtioul:u-Iy
relevant to the topic of this paper because many
psychologists (e.g .• McCaffery et nt. 1996) atgue that the pre~t~nce of :\ third pOrty nlters the
test situation to the extent that the validity of the
test results is significantly affected. There are
limited data on thill issue with regard to neulopsychological tests: the results of social facilitation research and one study with neuropsychological data do ~ugsest tha.t third partic~ I;an
have a significant effect on test perfonnance as
noted previously. Whereas more research is
needed to darify the effectt' of third l'arties 011
neuropsychological test results. preliminary data
suggest that using third parties In the testing situation i!: potentially in confiil;t with tbis principle.
2.02(b): "Psychologists refrain from the misuse of SI~seS!lroent techniques, iuterventions, re~ults, and interpretations and take reasonable
steps to prevent others from misusing the information these tochnique:s provide. This includes
refraining from l'elt~asing raw test results or raw
data to persons, other than to patients or clients
a~ llpptOpriato, who are 110t qualified to use SUch
information" .
Commml. To some extent principle 2.02(b)
reiterates the more gem:ral point made by principle 1.16. However, it also specifically refers to
the problem of releasing raw data to unqualified
per~on~ . One could argue that allowing a third
party to be present during an evaluation constitutes releasing raw data to that third party.
Thel'eruTe, If the individual is not a neuropsyChologist, the presence of the third party during
a neuropsychological examination represents a
potential ethical conflict.
2.04(c): Use of Assessment in General and
with Special Populations. "PsychologistS attempt to identify situations in which panicular
interpretations or assessment techniques or
nonns may nOt be applicable .. ."
Comment. Although the focus of 2.04 (c) is
on issues of raCial, sexual, ethnic, and similar
discrimination we should be aware that no
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nonns exi:;l for testing in the presence of third
party observers.
2.05: ITHerpreting Assessment Results:
"Wltc::n interpreting assessment results. including automated interpretations, psychologists
take into account the various test factors and
c,;huructertstics of the person being assessed that
might affect psychologists' judgements or reduce the accuracy of their interpretations. They
indicate any significant reservations they have
about the accuracy or limitations of their interpretations" .
Comment. This standard applies directly to
the concerns about the effects of the presence of
a tbird party on the validity - and. consequently.
the intetprctability - of test results . Thus, if c1in~
ical neuropsychologists decide to permit a third
party to be present during the examination. they
should include appropriate caveats about the
validity of the test results in their reports.
McCaffery et al. (1996) su~gest that dillcrepandes between assessment results obtained over
different sessions, with or without third party
obsotvers, be discussed and that the behavior of
the third party ar\d possible impact on the test
results be described.

2.10 Maintaining Tut Security: "Psy<;holumake reasonable efforts to maintain the
integrity and security of tests and mher aSSessment techniques cnnsbtent with the law, contractual obligations, and in a manner thal permits compliance with the requirements of this
Ethics Code" .
Comment. Third party observers present potential risk to test security unless they agree not
to divulge any of the lest questions to others, in
advance of the evaluation.
5.02 Maintaining Confidentiality: "Psychologi~ts have a primary Obligation and take reasonable precautions to respect the confidential·
tty rights of those with whom they work or consult .. ."
Comment. Several confidentiality issues are
mised by the maner of third party observers.
This applic$ to buth the patient and the neuropsychologist being observed. In particular, the
neuropsychologist who Setves as an observer
should consider the limits of what he or she may
giStS
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teve:tl nbout the neufor:;Yl.:hologist in the context of conversations with colleagues and in

other legal cases.
7.01 Pmjessilmulism; "PsyChologists who
perform forensic functions, such as assessments.
interviews, consultations, reports or expert testimony, must comply with aU other provisions of
this Ethics Code to the extent that they apply
such activities ......
COIT11T11:nl. Standard 7.01 malces clear that the
other provi!lions of the Ethics Code apply to forensic simations in general and, by extension. to .
situations involving ttlird party observers. Thus.
should neuropsychologists agree to serve as
third party observers or to permit third parties to
be I-m:sem dUring fOrensic evaluations. the Ethics Code applies even if the situation is noo-traditi<mal in nature.
7.02 Forensic Assessments: (a) "Psychologist'!' assessments, recommendations. and reports are based on infonnation and techniques
(InclUding personal interviews of the individual.
when appropriate) sufficient to provide appropriate substantiation for their findings.
.
(b) bxcept as noted in (c), below. psychologists provide written or oml forensic reports or
testimony of the psychological characteristic:-; of
an individual only after they have conducted an
examination of the individual adequate to support their statements or conclusions.
(c) When, despite reasonable efforts. such an
examination is not feasible, psychologists clarify the impact of their limited information on the
reliability and validity of their reports and testimony, and they appropriately limit the nature
and ex.tent of their eOnc\II"10nll and recommendations".
Comment. Standard 1.02 indicates that. in
general. a neuropsychologist should only c:<,press an opinion about a person when he or she
has conducted a standard evaluation. If this is
not possible. 8!': il'\ the case when a thi .. d party Is
present. then the neuropsychologist should communicate the appropriate caveats, as noted
above, abollf the validity of the te~l dam.
7.04 TTUlhfoln.ess and Candor. "(a) In forensic testimony and reportS, psychologists testify
truthfully. honestly, and eandhlly and, conSIstent

with applicable legal procedures. describe fairl3
the bases for their testimony and conclusions."
(b) "Whenever necessary [0 avoid ml!<lead.
ing. psychologists ackMw\edge the limits 0 1
their data or conclusions."
Comment. Standard 7.04 again I.'!mphasize"
the need to communicate any limitations in the
validity of an examination that may result from
the presence of a third party.

7.06 Compliance with Law alld Rules. "IIl
pertonning forensic roles. psychologists arc rea·
sonably familiar with the rilles governing their
roles. Psychologists are aware of the occasionally competing demands placed upon them by
these principle!l lind the requirements of the
court system, and attempt to resolve these conflicts by making known their commitment to this
Ethics Cod/': and taking steps to resulve the conflict in a responsible manner" .
Commellt. Standard 7.06 indicates that it i~
the re~ponsibility of the neuropSYChologist to
recognize that the request to serve as, or permit
the presence of. a third party observer represents
1\ potential ethical conflict. The neuropsychOlogist is also obligated to let others. such as lawyers and/or judicial personnel. know of the con·
flict with the APA ethiCS code. Finally. the neuropsychologist is required (0 resolve the conflict
responsibly. As noted by Canter et aJ. (1994).
StOlndllrQ 7.06 does not require psychologists to
take "heroic" measures that might result in incarceration - for example. for di$obeyin~ n
judge's urder.

DISCUSSION

Requests or demands to allow the pre~E>ncc of II
third party observer present a challenge to
neuropsychologists. Although the Ethics Code
does not explicitly prohibit the presence of third
parties, We suggest that neuropsychologists
serving as expertS in litigation make an effort to
ex.clude observers ftom the portion of the forensic evaluation involving standardized testing.
One mny justify this position by citing the likeli hood thac the presenc~ of an intere!ltcd ob:;c:rver
is potentially a substantially confounding factor

..J~T.T"""

Sod

80vv-9P-p-fAn~l

.- .. -

ETHICAL ISSUES RELATED TO rnIRD PARTY OBSERVERS

and. as such. violSl\es: the lltrmdardized testing
environment. For the same reason, we would
generally recommend against serving as a third
party ob!'!crvet in a forensic eV:1luation_
A number of compromises may be offered if
the neurop1>ychologis( is faced with a request or
demand for :1 third party observer_ Thc prcncnce
of a third pany during the initial interview, in
which questions are asked about symptoms and
comfl'll\nts, memories about thc incident that
precipitated cognitive complaints. psychosocial
hi!'tory and related issues, is not inappropriate
~nd would not nocessarily compromise lIJC lcSt~
iog procedure (unless the observer objects to
certain questions and/or forbids the patient to
rMpond. thus "priming" th~ patieut IU be noncooperative). The observcr's departure at the
outset of the sta.ndardized testing ponion of the
evaluation would pl'C$crve its validiry and confidentiality wilhotlt denying the plaintiff's attorney critical information because standardized
a.dministr~tion jncludc~ vcrbatim responses to
most tests that can then be reviewed by the
plaintiff's expert.
Another :lUggesteu alternative is to record {he
testing session with audio Or audiovisunl devices, for review by the plaintiff's expen. A
third alternative i::; to anow the plaintiff's expert
(or other qunlified observer) to view the proceedings through a one-way window. However,
we should c4lution that tbe presumed relative
lack of observer effects with either of these alternatives awaits empirical confirmation and test
Beeuriry may be at risk. In addition. some defense attorneyl': may not agree to [hese terms.
Accordingly. we cannot endorse the use of recurding devices or viewing through one-way
windows without qualification_
Although the deCision of Rag}?e v_ MeAl
Universal Srudio.~ would seem to set a precedent
~gainst the use of third party observers. judges
10 most venues may order whatever a!'Nlnge~
mems they choose in accordance with the law in
their Jurisdiction. We suggest that neuropsychologists provide the coun with 8n affidavit explaining these issues. In many cases, such argu~ents prevail and. as in the case of Ragge.
Judge~ have ruled that no oh!:erver be present.

Ot""'lJ..L
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Whcnjudgcs rule thctt an observer be pre::ent. or

issue a coun order for a.n observer. the neuropsychologist should request that the observer be
a qUll.lifil:llll~uropsychologist. as defined by Division 40 criteria (1989). In addition. instructions to the observer should include stipulations
lo n:main as unobtrusive as posslble so as to
provide minimal for distraction or inftuence_
Finally. consistent with the suggestions of
McCaffery et a!. (1996). the neuropsychological
repon resulting from the evaluation should include a section concerning the behavior of the
observer and any possible effects the observer's
presence and behavior may have had on the Validity of the results_
In the final analysis. unloss the neuropsychologist is an employee of the coun, he or she can
always refuse to proceed with an evaluation if
reasonable conditions that preserve the validity
of the evaluation are not agreed upon. In SOme
cases. this may be the best recourse_
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant,
v.
WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and
FREMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
and
IDAHO INSURANCE
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Party ofInterest,
Defendants.

)
)
)
IC 2000-030269
)
)
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION
) TO SUSPEND PROCEEDING
)
)
)
FILE
)
)
2
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pursuant to I.e. §§72-433 and 72-434,
with supporting affidavit and memorandum, in the above-entitled matter on July 13, 2007.
On July 30, 2007, Defendants filed supplemental memorandum and affidavit. Defendants seek
an order from the Commission staying all proceedings in this matter until such time that
Claimant fully submits and cooperates during the examination to be conducted by Dr. Beaver.
The Referee having reviewed the file herein and being fully advised in the premises,
HEREBY ORDERS that Defendants' Motion to Suspend Proceedings is GRANTED.
Claimant may be accompanied by a medical doctor or a Ph.D. psychologist of her own
selection and at her own expense.

Claimant may audio tape - but not video tape - the

examination at her own expense.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS - 1

")(

-,

Attorneys are not permitted to be present at the examination.
These conditions are consonant with longstanding practice of the Industrial Commission
as with Idaho case law regarding worker's compensation cases.
This stay shall remain until Claimant cooperates with an examination to be conducted by
Dr. Beaver to be set at a time and place in the near future and agreeable to all parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

d..~

day of August, 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

an~

I hereby certify that on the
day of August, 2007, a true
correct,?op,Xof
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS was 9~b:t.'YJJ';:'~1i1tiiJlf1fl{ift
"' '.' ". '" " JJ:';, . .,.... 'c', 2<,~'j,.·
Mlichili:e;I/I!h~:ess. ONLY upon each of the following:
'

R. Brad Masingill

Fax #: 208-414-0490

Christ T. Troupis

Fax #: 208- 93+482

Alan K. Hull

Fax #:

3~4-551 0

db

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS - 2

/

R. Brad Masingill
Attorney at Law
27 West Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone # 208 414-0665
Facsimile # 208414-0490
Email bmasingill@Jiotmail.com

Christ T. Troupis
Troupis Law Office
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
P. O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
Telephone # 208 938-5584
Facsimile # 208 938-5482
Email ctroupis@troupislaw.com
Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant,

vs.
WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,

And
FREMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE GROUP,
Surety,
Defendants

)
)
) Case No.: I.C. No. 00-030269
)
)
)
) REQUEST FOR CALENDARING
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I
Request for Cale*daring - 1

TO:

The above-named Defendants, WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, Employer and FREMONT
COMPENSATION INSURANCE GROUP, Surety, Defendants, and their/its attorney of record,
Alan K. Hull of the Firm ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP:
COMES NOW, LESIA KNOWLTON, Claimant in the above-entitled case, by and through

her attorneys of record R. Brad Masingill, of Weiser, Idaho, and Christ T. Troupis of Eagle, Idaho, and
hereby files the following Claimant's Request for calendaring, pursuant to the Industrial Commission
Rules of Procedure, Rule XII.
Claimant hereby requests that the case be set for hearing. Claimant is not completely medically
stable, but accurate data can now be presented for evaluation.
Further, Claimant has answered discovery, per the request of Defendants, and is therefore
completely prepared and ready for hearing.
The issues to be heard and decided by the COmmISSIOn include the extent of claimant's
permanent impairment, the extent of claimant's disability, and total temporary disability, as well as
retraining benefits and attorney fees.
Claimant herein requests that the matter be set for hearing at the Industrial Commission offices
in Boise, Idaho.

COUNSEL'S NON-AVAILABLE DATES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

SEE ATTACHED CALENDAR

DATED this 30th day of November, 2007.

Christ T. Troupis
Attorney for Claimant

Request for Calendaring - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the 30th day of November, 2007, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing REQUEST FOR CALENDARING mailed by regular United State mail, postage prepaid
thereon to the following:
AlanK. Hull
ANDERSON, WLIAN & HULL, LLP
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
P. O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

~j)P

Christ T. Troup~
Attorney for Claimant

Request for Calendaring - 3

Anderson, Julian & Hull
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone:
(208) 344-5800
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510
Alan K. Hull B ISB No.: 1568
Matthew O. Pappas, ISB No. 6190
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESIA KNOWLTON,
I.C. No. 00-030269
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
CALENDARING

WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and
FREMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE GROUP,
Surety,
and
IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION, Party of Interest,
Defendants.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 1

<J

--n
..
r"!··~

vs.

--'
c:::I
n1

-.~

~:fl

Attorneys for Defendants

Claimant,

.........
.,..-..".

<=>

'U
.c
0

if,

COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their undersigned counsel of record,
and request the Commission calendar this matter for hearing as follows:
1.

Statement of readiness: Defendants believe this matter will be ready for

hearing after June 16,2008.
2.

Issues to be heard: When the matter is ready for hearing, the following

issues should be heard:
a.

The extent that Claimant's condition preexisted her injury and
apportionment thereto;

b.

Whether Claimant's present complaints are a proximate result
of her alleged exposure;

c.

The extent of Claimant's PPI and/or PPD;

d.

Whether Claimant is entitled to additional TTD's and/or
medical benefits;

e.

Whether Claimant is entitled to retraining benefits; and

f.

Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees.

3.

Location of hearing: Hailey/Ketchum/Sun Valley, Idaho.

4.

Unavailable dates: Counsel for Defendants has no time available for hearing

prior to June 16, 2008. Thereafter, counsel is unavailable:
June 30, 2008;
July 1-7,2008;
August 1-8, 2008;
September 1-8, 2008;
Counsel is available at any other time.
5.

Length of hearing: One day, plus post-hearing depositions.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 2

6.

Settlement negotiations: It is unknown whether this matter will settle prior

to hearing.
7.

Assignment to the Commissioners: There is no need to assign this matter

to the full Commission.
8.

Whether a translator or assisted device is necessary: No translator or

assisted device is necessary.
9:

Other: Because attorneys' calendars are constantly changing, the available

dates which are given in this Request may not be available at the time the matter is
calendared for hearing. Counsel for Defendants would request that the Commission
conduct a status conference prior to setting a hearing date for the purpose of setting
hearing and to ensure that the issues listed in the Notice of Hearing are correct. Counsel
for Defendants believes a conference will avoid setting the hearing on unavailable dates
and avoid mistakes in r7Pards to the issues to be heard
DATED this

if ~ay of December, 2007.
ANDERSON, JU IAN & HULL LLP

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / /'----day of December, 2007, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSfTOREQUEST FOR CALENDARING by delivering
the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A.
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
R. Brad Masingill
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 4

[~
[]
[]
[]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

[~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[]
[]
[]

Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant,
v.
WOOD RNER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and
FREMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
and
IDAHO INSURANCE
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Party of Interest,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC 2000-030269

NOTICE OF HEARING

F 1LED

2f

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on

JUNE 20, 2008,.t):TtO:OOA:N,t.;]!OliOms;j)A¥, at the Old County Courthouse (208-788-5500),
3rd Floor Meeting Room, 206 First Avenue South, in Hailey, ID 83333, County of Blaine,
State ofIdaho, on the following issues:
1.

Whether the condition for which Claimant seeks benefits was caused
by the alleged industrial accident.

2.

Whether apportionment for a pre-existing condition pursuant to
Idaho Code § 72-406 is appropriate.

3.

Whether Claimant is medically stable, and if so, the date thereof.

4.

Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits:
a) Temporary partial and/or temporary total disability benefits
(TPD/TTD);

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
J.

b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Pennanent partial impairment (pPI);
Disability in excess of impairment;
Retraining;
Medical care; and
Attorney fees.

DATED this

J7 t"--- day of December, 2007.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
,

r"

.

r~
~

~e'Referee
'.

" ' \ \..

.•.

r----

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J..7 rPt.--

I hereby certify that on the
day ofDecember?2007,~trueand correctcopy?f
the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING was served by ~T1IlJ)··:~TA'f~S~ElJ:'itIFi1IlJ>
MAIL upon each of the following:
R. Brad Masingill
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, ID 83672-0467

Christ T. Troupis
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

And by regular United States Mail to:

M. Dean Willis, CCR
P.O. Box 1241
Eagle, ID 83616

(855-9151)

db

cc:

Jenny Lovell (208-788-5500 x 1111)
Assistant to Blaine Commissioners
206 First Avenue South, Suite 300
Hailey, ID 83333
e-mail address:jlovell@co.blaine.id.us

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2

AlanK. Hull
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant,
v.
WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and
FREMONT COMPENSATION
WSURANCECOMPANY,
Surety,
and
IDAHO WSURANCE
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Party of Interest,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC 2000-030269

ORDER ESTABLISHING
BRIEFING SCHEDULE

F J L EO

MAR 1 3 2009
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

The Referee reviewed the file and sets the following briefing schedule:
Claimant's opening brief shall be filed with the Commission on or before MAY 1,
2009. Defendants' responsive brief shall be filed on or before MAY 15, 2009.
Claimant shall have until MAX 29, 2009, if he wishes, to file a reply brief.
Please advise this office in writing if a reply brief will NOT be submitted.
Pursuant to a directive from the Commissioners, four copies of all briefs shall be filed

along with the original to facilitate review of cases.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

13~

day of March, 2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

3 rY--

I hereby certify that on the 1
day of March, 2009, a true and correct copy of the
ORDER ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE was served by regular United States
Mail upon each of the following:
R. Brad Masingill
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, ID 83672-0467
Christ T. Troupis
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
Matthew O. Pappas
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707

db

ORDER ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 2
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;)4/10/09

lOP
Christ I roupis
16: 14 FAX 208:1445510

208-938-5482

p,1
'ffjVV.Ji VV,*

ORIGI

Anderson, Julian & Hull
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Offioe Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Te\ephone: (20B) 344-5800
Facsimile:
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant,
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VS.

WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and

FREMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE GROUP,
Surety,

and

IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY
ASSOCIA TJON, Party of Interest,
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COMES NOW the above listed parties and hereby submit this Stipulation to
schedule post-hearing briefing as foJ[ows:
Claiman1's opening brief shall be flied with the Commission on

or before JUNE 12, 2009. Defendants' responsive brief shall be filed
on or before JUNE 26, 2009. Claimant shall have until JULY 10,
2009, if she wishes, to file a reply brief and will advise the
Commission ill writing if a reply brief will NOT be submitted.
Pursuant to a directive from the Commissioners, four{4} copies of all briefts shall

be filed along with the original to facilitate review of cases.
DATED this (od"1-day of

~t~B8rl 2009.
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A.

BYO-~
Christ Troup/s, Of the

Flrm

Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant,

I.C. No. 00-030269

vs.

WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
STRIKE CLAIMANT'S POSTHEARING REPLY BRIEF

Employer,
and
FREMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE GROUP,
Surety,
and
IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY
ASSOCIA TION, Party of Interest,
Defendants.
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COME NOW, the Defendants, Wood River Medical Center, and

the Idaho

Insurance Guaranty Association, successor in interest to Ferment Compensation
Insurance Group, by and through the undersigned Counsel of record, and hereby files
this Motion to Strike Claimant's July 10, 2009, Post-Hearing Reply Brief. Specifically,
Defendants object to Claimant's submitting a Reply Brief in excess of approximately
one and one-half (1 %) pages, as that exceeds the allotted amount provided under
J .R.P. Rule 11 (A). As explained by the Industrial Commission, "Subsection A limits
briefing to 30 pages unless prior approval is obtained for additional briefing." J.R.P.
11 (A) CMT,.
Claimant's counsel's initial brief, which was forwarded to the Commission on
June 9, 2009, was forty-five (45) pages long.

After defense counsel phoned

Claimant's counsel and informed them of the thirty page limit for all briefing, including
both the initial brief and the reply brief. Claimants' counsel submitted a new brief on
June 11, 2009, that was twenty-eight and one-half (28 %) pages long. Defendants
filed their brief with the Commission on June 26, 2009, which was twenty-nine (29)
pages long.

Defense counsel was shocked to see Claimant then filed a thirty (30)

page reply brief on July 10, 2009.
As mentioned above,

Defendants base this motion upon the Industrial

Commission Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Rule 11 (A). The Rule specifically
states that unless prior approval is sought from the Commission, briefing should not be
in excess of thirty (30) pages. See id. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the
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Industrial Commission must follow their rules and deadlines. Medrano v. Niebauer,
136 Idaho 767, 40 P.3d 125 (2002).

Medrano involved the filing of a motion for

costs and attorney's fees past the deadline stated by the Commission.

The

Commission ordered the award of attorney's fees despite the late filing. The Supreme
Court held that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion by disregarding the
deadlines set by its own rule or order.
The Industrial Commission and its hearing officers are constrained by clear
statutory wording even it the result is harsh and arbitrary. Petrie v. Spalding Drywall,
117 Idaho 382, 788 P.2d 197 (1990). The Supreme Court of Idaho also dictated that
administrative regulations are subject to the same principles of statutory construction.

Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 21 P.3d 903 (2001). Where the language is
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the application of the rules of statutory
construction.

Kootenai Electric Co-op, Inc. v. Washington Water Power Co., 127

Idaho 432, 901 P.2d 1333 (1995). Claimant's July 10, 2009, Reply Brief does not
comply with and, in fact, directly contradicts controlling Commission procedural
dictates.
The Comment to Rule 11 (A) clarifies any questions that may exist regarding the
page limits for post-hearing briefing when it unambiguously states "Section (A) limits
briefing to 30 pages." The inclusion of the "in" to briefing solidifies that each party
has 30 pages total to present their argument.

If this was not the case, then the

defendant in a matter would always be faced with a punitive 30 page limit and
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claimant would get the windfall of a 60 pages. No prior stipulation or approval was
sought regarding an over-limit reply brief and it was made expressly clear to Claimant's
counsel when they filed their amended initial brief that the 30 page limit applied to all
briefing.
Claimant's "Reply Brief" is inappropriate, as well as specifically precluded and
must be stricken as a matter of law and procedure. Claimant should have taken into
account how many pages she would devote to her reply when her initial brief was
crafted. Based upon the foregoing arguments and authority, Defendants respectfully
request that the Industrial Commission strike Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief and
proceed to render an opinion based upon the amended initial brief filed by Claimant and
Defendant's Post-Hearing Response.
If necessary, Defendants request oral argument on the matter.
DA TED this

/ () day of July, 2009.

ANDERSON JULIA

By:
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of July, 2009, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE CLAIMANT'S POSTHEARING REPLY BRIEF by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:

R. Brad Masingill
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672

[ /U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
J Hand-Delivered
[ ] ~vernight Mail
[v-l Facsimile

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A.
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Suite 130
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616

[ ~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ]
Hand-Delivered
[ J/Overnight Mail
[-1 Facsimile

[
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K. I::)rad Masingill

208 414-D490

R. BRAD MASlNGILL, ISB No. 2083
Attorney at Law
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. &x467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone (208) 414-0665
Fax (208)414-0490
Email bmasingill@hotmail.com

Christ T. Troupis~ ISB No. 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130
P. 0# Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
Telephone (208) 938-5584
Fax (208) 938-5482
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESIA KNOWLTON,

)

IC No.: 00-030269

)
Claimant,

)
)

vs.

)
)
)
)
}
)
)
)

WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER.

Employer,
And

FREEMONT COMPENSATION

)

INSURANCE COMPANY,

)
)

Surety,

)
)

Defendants,

CLAIMANT'S OBJEcnON TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
STRIKE BRIEF
1.-
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---------------------------------)
COME NOW, the above-named Claimant, Lesia Knowlton, by and through her
attorney's of record" R Brad MasingiU and Christ T. Troupis, and hereby respond and object to
the motion to strike filed by the Defendants on Friday, July 10, 2009.
First" 1he rule upon which the Defendant's motion is made states in pertinent part:
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COME NOW, the above-named Claimant, Lesia Knowlton, by and through her
attorney's of record, R. Brad Masingill and Christ T. Troupis, and hereby respond and object to
the motion to strike filed by the Defendants on Friday, July 10,2009.
First, the rule upon which the Defendant's motion is made states in pertinent part:

Claimant's Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief 1

"No brief in excess of 30 pages, exclusive of any addendum or exhibit, shall be filed
without the Commission's prior approval."

The rule is clear and unambiguous in that it does not state, or imply, that the total pages
of the Claimant's briefing is limited to 30 pages. In fact, it would have been easy to have simply
so stated that the combined number of pages for claimant's briefs, initial and reply, are limited to
30 pages. Since the rule does not so specify, it is clear each brief of the claimant is subject to the
30 page rule.
Additionally, several other problems exist if the Defendant's interpretation of the rule is
adopted:

1.

The reason for plaintiff's (or a claimant in the present case) being able to have the

first and last comment on the evidence in a case, is the plaintiff has the burden of proof
Defendant's interpretation removes that right; and
2.

The interpretation by the Defendant also creates a situation where the claimant

could limit its initial brief to one line and reserve the remaining 29 pages for the closing. The
Defendant, then, would have nothing to rebut.

In turn, the claimant's right to rebut the

Defendant's brief would be rendered meaningless, or the claimant would simply file its entire
argument in its reply brief and thus thwart the Defendant's right to reply to claimant's
arguntents; and

3.

The Defendant's argument further fails to follow the rules of statutory

construction. Any rule, ordinance, statute, or the like is to be interpreted in such a way as to not
strain the meaning of the words, nor to change the entire intention of the rule. Defendant's
interpretation of the rule requires the Commission to add words to the rule which do not appear
in it. Such a construction is not only strained, but re-writes the entire rule and changes its clear
Claimant'S Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief 2

mearnng. The clear intention is to limit each brief to 30 pages, not to create a situation where the
claimant or the Defendant has to guess at what the other is going to put into the very last brief
being filed.
4.

Furthermore, the use of the "Comment" as a means of construction of the rule

presupposes the rule is ambiguous.

In fact, the rule is not ambiguous, but only becomes

ambiguous when the Defendant attempts to use the "Comment" to supplement it. The Comment
is not intended to be a method of contradicting the clear wording of the rule, but to advise the
claimant and Defendant to avoid duplication and redundancy in their arguments.
5.

Also, the words in the Comment i.e. "Subsection A limits briefmg to 30 pages" is

not consistent with the Defendant's tortuous construction. The word briefing is both "singular"
and "plural" as it is used in the Comment. In other words, the word "briefing" can mean the
claimant's briefing (either the initial brief or the reply brief, or both).

It can mean the

Defendant's briefing (Defendant's only brief). To torture the words to support a conclusion that
it must mean the claimant is limited to only a total of 30 pages for both its briefs, renders the
word "reply" (as used in the rule to describe the right of each party to respond to the others brief)
meaningless. The Defendant's construction would allow the claimant to put nothing in its initial
brief, thus giving the Defendant nothing to "reply" to. It is abundantly clear the rule intended to
have the claimant fully set forth its case, the Defendant to attempt to rebut the same, and for the
claimant to reply to the Defendant's attempted rebuttal.

Defendant's construction would

emasculate the intention of the words "reply" when referring to the parties' briefing. Statutory
construction does not allow removing words of a rule to fit a construction any more than it
permits a party to add words to make it fit a construction; and
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6.
"brief', not

Finally, the words of the rule itself belay the Defendants interpretation. The word
"brief~",

is used in explaining the allowed pages. The rule states in pertinent part:

"No brie(in excess of 30 pages ....... ". Under the Defendant's construction, the rule would not
limit each "brief' to 30 pages, it would limit all brieh. to 30 pages.

The Defendant's

interpretation could also be construed that all briefmg, Defendants and claimants, is limited to 30
pages. As such, the claimant's 30 page brief would not allow any brief by the Defendant
because all the "briefing" had been completed.

The possible results from the Defendant's

interpretation of the rule are indeed as preposterous as the "surprise" of Defendant's counsel.

Claimant agrees with Defendant's claim that agency rules are subject to statutory
construction. Mason v Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581 (2001). In fact, the Court uses statutory
construction when interpreting the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Lawrence Warehouse Co. v.

Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 396, 405 P.2d 634,637-38 (1965) (interpreting LR.C.P. 65(a)
and 52(a)).

In matters of construction, preference is for an interpretation of rules which gives

meaning to every word, clause, and sentence. Robison v. Bateman-Hall Inc., 139 Idaho 207,
210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003).

The flip side of this rule of construction is it is improper to insert

words or phrases into a sentence to alter its meaning, as Defendant's construction requires.

It is axiomatic that the central rule of statutory construction is "where the language of a

statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without

Claimant's Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief 4

Ir.-

engaging in statutory construction." State v. Pina, Docket No. 34192 (Idaho 7/8/2009) (Idaho,
2009).
Statutes are not to be construed as to negate them entirely.

See State v

Burtlow, 144 Idaho 455, 163 P.3d 244 (2007) which states:
"It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a
nullity .... Constructions of a statute that lead to an absurd result are disfavored."
(Citations Omitted).

Moreover, "ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present differing
interpretations to the court." Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs of

Valley County, 132 Idaho 551 (1999); Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349 (2005) (both
interpreting ordinances which are subject to the same statutory construction.)
The Defendant's strained interpretation of rule 11 violates every rule of construction,
including that rule which states if it is not ambiguous no construction is necessary. Rule 11 is
straight forward and unambiguous. It states no brief.... shall be filed.

No construction is

necessary.
The worker's compensation law in Idaho is to be construed in favor of the injured
worker. Thus, any interpretation which inures to the benefit of the claimant is required.
The principle often stated is that workmen's compensation provisions are to be construed
liberally in favor of the claimant. Miller v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 105 Idaho 725, 672 P.2d
1055 (1983)
The liberal construction principle has been applied in several cases to determine whether
an employee is entitled to a particular benefit. In these cases the Court has frequently construed

statutes in a manner that favors the award of benefits. Flock v.

J.e.

Idaho 220, 242, 118 P.2d 707, 716 (1941).

Claimant's Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief 5

Palumbo Fruit Co., 63

Not only is the Defendant's interpretation of rule 11 improper under a statutory
construction analysis, it would violate the liberal construction requirement under the worker's
compensation law.
Finally, in response to Mr. Pappas claim that he was "surprised", it must be pointed out
that Mr. Masingill was never advised by Mr. Pappas of his "interpretation of the rule. Mr.
Masingill did not speak with Mr. Pappas about this at any time whatsoever.

The only

communication took place by Mr. Masingill's secretary calling Mr. Pappas' office asking if he
would object to a motion to include more than thirty pages in the claimant's initial brief. Mr.
Pappas' office responded that "he would have to ask his client". Mr. Masingill was home ill that
day and was advised by his secretary of Mr. Pappas' response.

Mr. Masingill's instructed his

secretary to respond that there was no need to "ask his client", and that the brief would be
reduced in length. Any implication in the Defendant's motion whatsoever that Mr. Masingill
was advised of the Defendant's interpretation of the rule is inaccurate.
Claimant requests attorney's fees and costs for having to respond to this frivolous motion.

Dated: July 16, 2009.

asingill
Attorney for Claimant
Leisa Knowlton
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY certify that on Ju1y 16, 2009, I caused to serve a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Claimant's Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief in the above referenced case by
first class u.s. mail, postage prepaid, and by electronic mail upon the following:

Matthew Pappas
Anderson, Julian & Hu1I, LLP
POBox 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

Claimant's Objection to Motion to Strike Reply Brief 7

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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v.
WOOD RNER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and
FREMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
and
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FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND RECOMMENDATION

FILED

NOV - 3 2009
IN8USTlllAL COMMISSION

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned this
matter to Referee Douglas A. Donohue. He conducted a hearing in Hailey on June 20, 2008.
Christ T. Troupis and R. Brad Masingill represented Claimant. Matthew Pappas represented
Defendants. The parties presented oral and documentary evidence. Due to the large number
of witnesses, the record was held open for the taking of additional depositions. The parties
submitted briefs. The case came under advisement one year later on July 15, 2009. It is now
ready for decision.
ISSUES
The issues to be resolved according to the amended notice of hearing are:
1.

Whether the condition for which Claimant is seeking benefits was caused
by the alleged industrial accident;

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION -1

2.

Whether apportionment for a preexisting condition pursuant to Idaho code
72-406 is appropriate;

3.

Whether Claimant is medically stable and, if so, when; and

4.

Whether and to what extent claimant is entitled to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f

Temporary disability (TTD),
Pennanent impainnent (PPI),
Permanent disability,
Retraining,
Medical care benefits, and
Attorney fees.

Defendants moved to strike Claimant's reply brief as being overlong under Commission
Rules. Without comment on the merits of the varying interpretation of the Rules, Defendants'
motion is Denied.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Claimant contends she was exposed to an odor for several hours at work. The odor came
from the improper use of chemical, probably sulfuric acid, to unstop a plugged toilet or bathroom
floor drain. She suffered injury to her lungs. She has been unable to work around any odor
since.

She is totally disabled as an odd-lot worker.

Defendants' actions give rise to her

entitlement to an attorney fee award.
Defendants contend Claimant was not actually injured by the odor. She has failed to
prove it caused any lung injury.

The symptoms Claimant complains of are a result of

longstanding asthma exacerbated by gastroesophageal reflux disease ("GERD"). Her inability
to tolerate benign odors demonstrates the existence of a psychological component to her
symptoms which is unrelated to the accident.

She is not entitled to benefits.

Moreover,

Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association ("the Fund") is not liable for medical payments previously
reimbursed by any third-party payer and is not liable for attorney fees by statute,
Idaho Code § 41-3605(7).
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EVIDENCE CONSIDERED

The record in the instant case consists of the following:
1.

Hearing testimony of Claimant, and of toxicologist Stephen Munday,
M.D.;

2.

Claimant's Exhibits 35 - 57;

3.

Defendants' Exhibits 1 - 34;

4.

Posthearing depositions of Claimant's father Warren "Dan" Gorringe,
Claimant's husband David Knowlton, and former employee Jay Brown;

5.

Posthearing depositions of expert witnesses pUlmonologist Holly Carveth,
M.D.; allergy and immunologist and treating physician Ronald Fullmer,
M.D.; neuropsychologist Craig Beaver, Ph.D.; vocational rehabilitation
experts Douglas A. Donohue Cmm and Barbara Nelson.

After examining the evidence, the Referee submits the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendation for review by the Commission.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Claimant worked for Employer as a unit secretary.

On September 12, 2000,

she was working at her station when a maintenance man used a chemical to unstop a toilet
or bathroom floor drain in a patient's room.

The chemical caused a foul odor which

Claimant described as an "orange citrusy" smell "like an air freshener."

Hospital staff

ventilated the area by placing a portable fan in the doorway of the patient's room.
Combined with other fans which were always present, the smelly air blew past Claimant's
station for the rest of her shift. Claimant recalls that the odor "got stronger and stronger" as
the day wore on.

Claimant also recalls smelling another odor, like "rotten eggs," coming

from the kitchen around lunchtime.

This odor was not as strong around her work station.

She recalls kitchen personnel telling her that smell was coming up through the drains.
2.

After several people complained about the "citrusy" odor, Claimant began calling
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supervisors and others to ameliorate the odor. The director of nurses and the infection control
nurse conferred and moved a patient from the room where the chemical was used to
another part of the hospital.
3.

Claimant recalls that she heard at least one person complain that the odor was

giving her a headache. Claimant developed her first symptom, a headache, later that day.
4.

In a 2003 deposition, Claimant first recalled that she worked from just after

8:00 a.m. until 11 :30 p.m. She described in detail taking a meal break about 7:00 p.m. and
noticing that her lungs burned as she took deep breaths in the cold outdoor air. By the date
of hearing, after reviewing documents, she recalled that she worked only until about 4:00 p.m.
She recalls that by the time she finished her shift and got horne, she had developed a cough
and body aches. She recalls that by the next morning she had a productive cough.
5.

Claimant arrived to work her regular shift the day following the exposure.

As the day progressed, her symptoms worsened. She arranged to be relieved around lunchtime.
She also worked only a partial day on the next day as well.
6.
on Friday.

The exposure occurred on a Tuesday. Claimant first sought medical attention
On September 15, 2000, she visited Laria Thomas, F.N.P.

Nurse Thomas

recorded Claimant complained of a "cough, sore throat, burning when she takes a breath."
Examination revealed "Posterior pharynx is trace injection.
lymphadenopathy bilaterally.

Clear bilateral breath sounds."

Minimal submandibular
Nurse Thomas prescribed

antibiotics, cough syrup and an inhaler. A chest X-ray taken on a follow up visit showed
was normal.
7.

When Claimant returned to work on Monday, she completed an accident report.

At that time, Claimant was told the chemical used to unstop the toilet was sulfuric acid.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 4

A material safety data sheet ("MSDS") describes hazards associated with a sulfuric acid
containing product called Biotron.

Claimant doubts whether Employer has produced the

MSDS for the actual product she smelled on the date of the exposure.
8.

Claimant recalls she developed voice problems during the week following

her first medical visit.

This memory is unsubstantiated by medical records.

"Hoarseness"

first appears in the medical records one month after the exposure.
9.

On September 25, 2000, Claimant visited Thomas Pryor, M.D.

complaint he recorded was a cough.
and bronchitis in her lungs.

The only

On exam, Claimant was normal except for the cough

Her sinuses were normal.

which Claimant had linked to the exposure.

Dr. Thomas described bronchitis

On a September 28, 2000 follow-up visit,

Claimant reported she had developed a sore chest from coughing and a sore throat.
On examination, Dr. Pryor noted "pretty impressive inflammation" in her sinuses. He provided
a release from work.

By October 4, Dr. Pryor noted Claimant's inflammation had

"improved profoundly."
10.

On October 4, 2000, Nurse Thomas provided Claimant a release from work

retroactive to the date of the exposure.
11.

On October 5, 2000, Claimant telephoned Nurse Thomas and reported a second

exposure, this time to "some cleaners" at work which, Claimant reported had caused a flare up.
12.

On October 13, 2000, Claimant visited Ronald Fullmer, M.D. She complained

of shortness of breath and hoarseness.

A history taken at that visit noted Claimant began

smoking cigarettes "less than" one year earlier.

She reported a "burning" in her nasal

passages occurred at the time of the September 12, 2000 exposure but had resolved.
On examination, Dr. Fullmer noted that Claimant's vocal distortion became more normal
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when she was "off the topic" of the exposure. Her head, eyes, ears, nose, and throat were
all objectively normal, as was her breathing.
13.

On October 25, 2000, Nurse Thomas prescribed Wellbutrin at Claimant's

request to help her stop smoking.
14.

On December 11, 2000, Claimant reported to Nurse Thomas that she

experienced two episodes of reactions to food.
sulfa-containing component to the food.

Claimant inquired about MSG or some

She described eye and skin symptoms.

symptoms were not noted in the record of her examination that day.
in food arose after Claimant began her own internet research.

These

An issue of sulfites

No medical provider has

opined that other sulfur-containing chemicals are clinically related to sulfuric acid in a way that
might exacerbate symptoms caused by exposure to the latter.
15.

By the time of her December 20, 2000 visit to Dr. Fullmer, she had developed

new symptoms which she attributed to new triggers.

On examination, Dr. Fullmer again

found all relevant systems to be objectively normal. He opined, "It seems quite unlikely that
she would have persistent inflammation or injury related to the exposure 3Yz months ago."
He attributed her symptoms to "anxiety." Later, Dr. Fullmer opined that Claimant suffered
a "minor to mild injury" which lasted "possibly of a prolonged duration of perhaps" four to
six weeks. He opined that any injury or symptoms lasted no more than four to six weeks.
He opined that her increasing, multiple complaints were not related to the exposure but
were possibly related to very mild asthma, secondary gain, or anxiety.

He opined her

vocal symptoms were "psychogenic." He rated her as having no restrictions and no PPI.
16.

Claimant recalls that the inhaler which was prescribed made her nauseated,

dizzy, and gave her a headache. Dr. Fullmer's record addressed the possibility that a steroid
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inhaler could exacerbate some throat discomfort. The steroid inhaler was discontinued.
17.

On December 27, 2000, Claimant first visited Richard E. Henry, M.D.

From this visit forward, Claimant provided her treating physicians with a history which was
materially inconsistent with the medical records generated in September and October 2000.
18.

In the weeks and months after the exposure, Claimant continued to develop

additional symptoms whenever she came near an ever-expanding list of triggering odors.
She developed bouts of hives and body rashes, watery eyes, scratchy throat, sinus swelling
and runny nose, dental problems, and other symptoms. She came to link various combinations
of symptoms to exposure to cold air, motor vehicle exhaust-both gasoline and diesel,
animal dander, pollens, dust, soaps and cleaning products, perfumes and scents in grooming
products, the smell of marking pens, industrial chemicals used for farm machinery
maintenance, consumption of alcohol and many foods, wood smoke and other people's
cigarette smoke, etc.

Incongruously, she occasionally smoked cigarettes while driving but

reported no breathing or other problems when doing so.
19.

Specific allergen testing by pinprick to her back produced negative results for

every pollen, dander, and chemical tested.
Prior Medical History

20.

In 1988 at age 18, Claimant was examined by Dr. Fullmer.

Complaints, she included mild dyspnea.

Among her

Dr. Fullmer testified he considered differential

diagnoses including chronic bronchitis and early asthma, but believed depression was the
more likely cause.
21.

In 1997 and 1998, Claimant reported a two-year history of intermittent irritability

and fatigue. Claimant suspected a thyroid problem.
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22.

According to her reports to doctors, Claimant began smoking sometime

between August 25, 1998 and April 13, 1999. Claimant inconsistently reported her smoking
habits after the exposure.
23.

On May 28, 1999, Claimant visited Nurse Thomas and complained of eye and

nose symptoms related to mowing the lawn. Nurse Thomas diagnosed allergic rhinitis.
Physicians' Opinions

24.

In deposition, treating physician Ronald Fullmer, M.D., opined Claimant's

symptoms were inconsistent with exposure to inhaled sulfuric acid.

He considered GERD

to be the more likely cause. He considered differential diagnoses of mild asthma and anxiety
to be more likely than reactive airways dysfunction syndrome ("RADS"). He opined that the
onset of increasing symptoms in the weeks after the exposure was more likely evidence of
a psychological component. He held to his opinions expressed in his medical records in 2000.
Dr. Fullmer explained his reasons underlying his opinions.

Giving the Claimant the benefit

of any possible doubt, he opined Claimant became medically stable from any possible
inhalation injury within six weeks of the exposure.
25.

Nurse Thomas was sympathetic with the diagnosis of RADS, but declined

to express an opinion.
26.

Holly Carveth, M.D.,

January 9, 2001.

IS

a pUlmonologist.

She first examined Claimant on

She opined Clamant suffered from RADS as a result of the inhalation

exposure. She opined Claimant also suffered from Irritable Larynx Syndrome. She opined
Claimant's vocal cord dysfunction was related to anxiety and acid reflux.

She opined the

acid reflux was exacerbated by Claimant's cough which was caused by the inhalation exposure.
Dr. Carveth's opinions would not be changed if the chemical to which Claimant was exposed

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 8

was something other than sulfuric acid.

Dr. Carveth opined that the presence of the fans

concentrated the irritant which Claimant inhaled during the exposure.
27.

William W. Wallace, M.D., specializes in allergy immunology. On September 30,

2005, he conducted allergen testing by pinprick on Claimant's back. He opined she exhibited
no allergic reaction to any of the potential allergens for which he tested: pollens, dander, etc.
He opined she had no allergies related to possible sulfuric acid exposure.

He denied the

existence of a potential link between sulfites and Claimant's reported reactions to foods.
28.

On September 30, 2005, Stephen W. Munday, M.D., evaluated Claimant

at Defendants' request.
and toxicology.

Dr. Munday specializes in occupational environmental medicine

He opined Claimant does not suffer from RADS.

Dr. Munday is well

familiar with the criteria required for a diagnosis of RADS and has discussed it with the
doctor that first described and named the condition.
criteria for a diagnosis of RADS.

Claimant's history does not meet the

Dr. Munday opined Claimant's symptoms which

developed more than a few days after the exposure are not related to the exposure.
Noting that Claimant reported throat and lung symptoms but not eye and nose symptoms,
Dr. Munday opined these reported symptoms were inconsistent with an inhalation exposure
and were consistent with a diagnosis of GERD. He opined that the multiple tests Claimant
has undergone do not show it probable that Claimant suffers from asthma.
29.

In August 2007, Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D., performed a neuropsychological IME

at Defendants' request. He performed tests over a two-day visit with Claimant. He opined
inhalation exposure was not the predominate cause of Claimant's symptoms initially and
was not a probable cause of her later-appearing symptoms. He attributed her later-appearing
symptoms as probably psychologically, not physically, caused.

He opined that asthma was
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known to be related to somatization and that Claimant developed a "conditioned relationship"
of exhibiting symptoms as a result of emotional distress, anxiety, and depression, all of which
stemmed from a naIve personality.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS OF FACT

30.

Credibility - Claimant.

Claimant's demeanor was most notable for her

vocal distortion when she became emotional. From the outset of the hearing, she spoke with
a tight, high-pitched voice.

This came and went during questioning but was most clearly

brought on when she described emotionally charged events which brought her near tears.
Claimant became tearful and exhibited vocal distortion when describing events that brought
her sorrow and when describing events which brought her frustration.

This demeanor

exhibited more than a few times during her testimony at hearing. It was most notably absent
at times when she became argumentative with the cross-examiner.
31.

Claimant's testimony demonstrates she casually shifted from recalled fact to

speculation without being aware she had done so. In her attempts to answer questions, it is
impossible to separate actual memory from her supposed guesses at what might have happened.
32.

Materially significant portions of her testimony were internally inconsistent

among her 2003 deposition, her 2004 deposition, and her 2008 hearing testimony.

This is

not to say that Claimant deliberately lied. On the contrary, she appeared to attempt honesty
at all times. However, over time her memory has become so confabulated with the story of her
illness that no part of her memory ofthese events or her symptoms can be accepted at face value.
33.

Concerning her symptoms, treatment, and conversations with her medical

providers, Claimant's testimony is materially inconsistent with that of the physicians
who treated or examined her.

To the extent inconsistency arises, medical records and the
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physician's memory and testimony is given greater weight.
34.

Other Witnesses.

Claimant's recollection of conversations with vanous

co-workers is materially inconsistent with the memories of the co-workers.

Again, where

relevant to dispositive issues, the testimony of co-workers is given greater weight.
35.

A parade of family members and co-workers testified that before the date of

the exposure, Claimant was without symptoms and was a hard worker.
afterward, Claimant exhibited breathing, vocal, or other symptoms.

They testified that

Testimony concerning

these points is credible.
36.

Causation. A claimant must provide medical testimony that supports a claim for

compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Langley v. State, Industrial Special

Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 785, 890 P.2d 732, 736 (1995).
"having more evidence for than against."

"Probable" is defined as

Fisher v. Bunker Hill Company, 96 Idaho 341,

344,528 P.2d 903, 906 (1974). The exposure itself is problematic. An unknown chemical
of unknown strength was blown by fans a distance of over 15 feet down a hallway past
the place where Claimant sat. The best evidence of record suggests the chemical irritant was
likely sulfuric acid. Claimant provided only hearsay testimony that at least one person other
than herself reported a headache that day. No other co-workers were reportedly harmed in
any way.

Claimant reported that she smelled two separate odors, one coming from the

patient's room and the other coming from the kitchen.

Moreover, records show that

Claimant reported she experienced symptomatic reactions on two other occasions - October 4
and October 30 - to the smell of cleansers which were being used by co-workers.

These

cleansers were not shown to be in any way toxic. These subsequent episodes were merely
the first ofthe myriad smells Claimant asserts she became sensitized to.
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37.

Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome, ("RADS") was first described in 1985.

RADS is a subset or form of asthma. Among the clinical criteria required for a RADS diagnosis
are the "documented absence of preceding respiratory complaints ... very high concentrations
[of chemical irritant, and] ... onset of symptoms occurred within 24 hours after the exposure
and persisted for at least three months." Each of these factors is equivocal or absent according
to the medical records of treating physicians.
38.

Dr. Munday's thorough report and testimony was persuaSIve.

No external

chemical, whether sulfuric acid or another irritant, could likely have caused Claimant's lung
and throat symptoms without first significantly buming her eyes and nose.

The medical

records nearest the exposure noted that Claimant's most significant complaint was a cough.
Referring to the day of the exposure, there is a passing reference to a burning sensation
in Claimant's nose but no mention of eye irritation.

By context, if either her eyes or

nasal passages had been significantly burned, there would likely have been a more prominent
mention of it, and the examination would likely have revealed injury to those organs.
He explained how GERD was more consistent than chemical inhalation.

Dr. Munday also

explained why GERD was the likely cause of Claimant's cough and burning sensation in
her lungs and throat.
39.

The opinions of treating physician Dr. Fullmer and expert toxicologist

Dr. Munday are consistent with each other. Together, they establish that Claimant's exposure
on September 12, 2000 did not cause any symptoms or condition which would have
reasonably required medical care.
40.

However, this set of facts exposes a troubling proposition. Claimant genuinely

believed she had been exposed to a toxin.

An actual event made this belief reasonable.
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Employer was unable to immediately identify the chemical to which she had been exposed.
The policy of "sure and certain relief' for injured workers suggests that a worker in this
circumstance should not be strictly liable for the cost of initial diagnosis and treatment if
she is wrong about such an event being the cause of her symptoms.

Throughout the rest

of September and October 2000, Nurse Thomas, Dr. Pryor, and Dr. Fullmer all provided
reasonable medical care related to the exposure, even though the event was ultimately
determined not to have caused Claimant's condition. Dr. Fullmer acted cautiously in opining at
the time of treatment that Claimant's symptoms were probably related to the exposure.
Dr. Fullmer's abundance of caution in his initial assessments of Claimant are sufficient to
allow Claimant medical benefits for that initial six -week period.
41.

Claimant is not entitled to temporary total or partial disability benefits because

this was found to be a noncompensable claim. While the Commission is awarding medical care
for the initial six -week period, we have found Claimant is entitled to medical care as an expense
of investigating the compensability of the claim.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Claimant failed to show that the symptoms for which she sought medical

attention probably were related to the exposure to odor she experienced on September 12, 2000.
2.

Claimant's medical treatment for the six weeks following the September 12,2000

exposure was a reasonably related precautionary to exposure by an unknown airborne irritant
and therefore, Claimant is entitled to medical benefits for that period only.
3.

Claimant failed to show she was entitled to temporary disability benefits or

any other workers' compensation benefits.
4.

All other issues are moot.
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RECOMMENDATION

The Referee recommends that the Commission adopt the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as its own and issue an appropriate final order.
DATED this

/6 j~ay of October, 2009.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

l~
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant,
v.

WOOD RNER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and
FREMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
and
IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION,
Party of Interest,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC 2000-030269

ORDER

FILiD

NOV - 3 2009
INIUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-717, Referee Douglas A. Donohue submitted the record
in the above-entitled matter, together with his recommended findings of fact and conclusions
of law to the members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review.

Each of the

undersigned Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendations of the Referee.
The Commission concurs with these recommendations. Therefore, the Commission approves,
confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed fmdings of fact and conclusions oflaw as its own.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Claimant failed to show that the symptoms for which she sought medical

attention probably were related to the exposure to odor she experienced on September 12,2000.
2.

Claimant's medical treatment for the six weeks following the September 12, 2000

exposure was a reasonably related precautionary to exposure by an unknown airborne irritant
and therefore, Claimant is entitled to medical benefits for that period only.
ORDER-l

3.

Claimant failed to show she was entitled to temporary disability benefits or

any other workers' compensation benefits.
4.

All other issues are moot.

5.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all

matters adjudicated.

DATEDthiS~daYOf AbIJQmb,2009.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Unavailable for signature

R. D. Maynard, Chao
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Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESIA KNOWLTON,

)

Claimant,

vs.
WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
And

FREEMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants,

IC No.: 00-030269

)
)
)
)

)
)
)

CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT
TO IDAHO CODE §72-718

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

------------------------------)
COME NOW, the above-named Claimant, Lesia Knowlton, by and through her
attorney's of record, R. Brad Masingill and Christ T. Troupis, and hereby moves for
reconsideration of the Order entered by the Commission in this case on November 3, 2009
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-718. This motion is based upon the grounds that the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and recommendations of the Referee Douglas A. Donohue and the Order
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration 1

entered by the Commission thereon are not based on substantial competent evidence, and the
findings do not as a matter of law support the order and award.
Dated: November 19,2009.

~

Troupis~

Christ T.
Attorney for Claimant
Leisa Knowlton

Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration 2

? __
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY certify that on November 19, 2009, I caused to serve a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration in the above referenced case by first class

u.s. mail, postage prepaid, and by electronic mail upon the following:
Matthew Pappas
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
PO Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
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R BRAD MASINGILL, ISB No. 2083
Attorney at Law
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone (208) 414-0665
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB No. 4549
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Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant,

vs.
WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
And

FREEMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC No.: 00-030269

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT
TO IDAHO CODE §72-718

COME NOW, the above-named Claimant, Lesia Knowlton, by and through her

attorney's of record, R. Brad Masingill and Christ T. Troupis, and submits the following
Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order entered by the
Commission in this case on November 3, 2009.
Claimant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 1

0

I

THE EVIDENCE PROVED THAT THE CLAIMANT'S
SYMPTOMS WERE RELATED TO THE INHALATION EXPOSURE
SHE EXPERIENCED ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2000
A. There is no support for the finding that Lesia Knowlton's symptoms were due to
pre-existing asthma or Gastric Esophageal Reflux Disease, "GERD."
1. No pre-existing asthma.
There was no medical evidence that Lesia Knowlton was ever diagnosed with asthma or
treated for respiratory problems of any kind prior to the 9112/00 exposure. The only oblique
reference to such an issue was in Dr. Fullmer's office note for one visit in November, 1988,
twelve (12) years prior to the chemical exposure. Lesia Knowlton was eighteen (18) at the time,
and saw Dr. Fullmer because she 'sleeps too long.' Dr. Fullmer made the following note in the
history he took that day. "Pt. plays volleyball and states that she is able to keep up with her piers
as far as exercise. She does have occasional mild dyspnea with running after her brother, but
denies other problems." Ex. 2, p. 1 Dr. Fullmer Assessment did not include any finding of
asthma, and he ultimately concluded that Lesia Knowlton's physical condition was entirely
normal. He testified:

"Q: And do you recall from maybe looking at your notes, did the physical exam reveal
any significant objective findings?
A: No. I think her physical exam was normal, as far as her chest goes. I think her breath
sounds were good. And I don't think she had any wheezing. You know, basically, my
note says that her chest exam was normal." RF Depo, p. 11, lines 4-11.
In his Assessment, Dr. Fullmer noted that there was no evidence of cardiac lesions, and
no historical evidence to go along with intrinsic pulmonary disease. Exh. 2, p. 3 Although Dr.
Fullmer noted the presence of "Clubbing," that finding was in error, because subsequent physical
exams by Dr. Carveth and defense expert, Dr. William Wallace both disclosed no clubbing. Exh.
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17, p. 2; WW Depo., p. 15, line 19 - 22. "And incidentally noted we did not find any clubbing of
the ends of her digits or fmgers, which would indicate chrome lung disease, which wasn't there."
Defense expert, Dr. Stephen Munday, admitted in his testimony at the hearing that Lesia
Knowlton was never diagnosed with asthma prior to the exposure. He said:

"Q: Now, do the records that - the medical records that you reviewed for Mrs. Knowlton
show any - were there ever any indications in the record that she had any asthmatic
condition or asthma prior to September 12, 2000?
A: Well, there has never been any records that I have seen anywhere that gave her a
diagnosis of asthma, so I would agree with that statement." Tr. p. 166, lines 10- 16.
2. No pre-existing GERD.
Lesia Knowlton was not diagnosed with GERD at any time prior to the exposure on
9/12/00. Dr. Fullmer testified:

"Q: And did she have any preexisting symptoms of GERD that had been disclosed in her
records?
A: I really didn't get a history of any significant gastroesophageal reflux disease." RF
Depo., p. 53, lines 12 - 16.
She was only diagnosed with GERD after Dr. Carveth had concluded she was suffering
from Reactive Airways Disease Syndrome, "RADS." That diagnosis occurred four months after
the exposure, in January, 2001. Dr. Carveth testified that the medical records of the
laryngoscopy examination of Lesia Knowlton's vocal cords on January 10,2001 do not mention
any findings ofGERD. There were no physical lesions or scars. HC Depo., p. 75, lines 14-15.
Dr. Carveth noted in her medical record that "They did not notice acid injury to her vocal cords."
Exh. 17, p. 15 ("Tissue appears healthy at this time and there is no evidence of any damage.")
Exh. 17, p. 17 ("No mass lesions. No other lesions or abnormalities in the laryngopharynx.") Dr.
Carveth testified that ifLesia had severe GERD prior to that time, there would have been some
evidence of acid injury to her vocal cords. HC Depo., p. 113, line 21 - p. 114, line 15.
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Lesia Knowlton told her treating physicians that she had an acid taste in her mouth when
she was exposed to the toxic odors on 9/12/00. Dr. Fullmer testified that it was not very likely
that the acid taste was indicative of the 'early onset of GERD.'

"Q: Doctor, could the acid taste in Claimant's throat also be a possible sign of a different
condition?
A: Well, sure, you could postulate other things.
Q: Is it possible she was maybe suffering from the early onset of GERD?
A: Well, acid reflux disease could cause burning in the person's throat, I mean, if they
had major reflux where they were having acid come all the way up the back of their
throat. They could even - and most typically, that would occur at night when the person
is asleep and can't protect their airway as well and could have acid all the way up in their
mouth and nose. But that's pretty rare to see that. For a person to have that while they're
alert and awake, and not have known significant severe acid reflux disease, it's probably
not very likely." (RF Depo., p. 18, lines 2 - 20.)
All of the medical evidence supports the conclusion that Lesia Knowlton's coughing
caused her to develop an acid reflux problem, including the absence of any prior diagnosis of
GERD, the fact that it did not develop until four months after the exposure, and the fact that
Lesia Knowlton had severe and uncontrollable coughing fits that started with the exposure. Dr.
Holly Carveth testified that "It's common that severe coughing episodes can bring out GERD."
HC Deposition, p. 19, Ll. 17 - 25. She also testified that:
"At times, GERD can be either brought on or worsened if someone gets into a situation
with a lot of coughing. And we see that actually sometimes post-operatively or someone
gets a lung infection ... .I would say that cough can cause and cough can worsen GERD.
The increased intraabdominal pressure can cause acid to go up into the esophagus when
previously that wasn't a problem .... So I wouldn't say that acid is the problem, but cough
or extreme chest tightness, struggling to breathe, that. .. can physiologically produce it."
HC Depo., p. 85, line 19 - p. 87, line 1.
It is undisputed that Lesia's coughing started with her exposure on 9112/00 and was a
direct result of that exposure. Lesia was exposed to the chemical fumes on Tuesday, September
12,2000 and saw Laira Thomas, a nurse practitioner, on Friday, September 15,2000. Exh. 5, p.
13. Her Assessment was "Cough possibly related to chemical exposure at work."
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She saw Dr. Thomas Pryor on September 25, 2000, ten days after the exposure. He noted
that her cough was so severe anytime she increases her respiratory rate, that she cannot function.
Dr. Pryor's diagnostic assessment was "toxic exposure to sulfuric acid, accidental, with
secondary bronchitis. Exh. 9, p. 5.
It is also likely that GERD developed in part because Lesia Knowlton was put on steroids
by Dr. Pryor and gained 40 pounds. She reported the first onset of acid reflux after this weight
gain and a month prior to her visit with Dr. Carveth in January, 2001. Ex. 17, p. 9.

B. The evidence shows that the exposure occurred and caused Lesia Knowlton's
symptoms.
1. Evidence of Ms. Knowlton's exposure was undisputed.
Lesia Knowlton's testimony and the corroborating testimony of Joyce Fogg about the
presence of strong odors at her nurse's station was undisputed in the record. Ms. Knowlton
testified,

"I didn't really notice that it was toxic, so to speak, it just - the longer you sat there and
smelled it - at first it started getting real annoying, because you couldn't get the smell out
of the air. Later, one of the nurses had come up the hall and said, man, that stuff reeks.
What is that smell? And 1 didn't think anything of it. Later she came back said we need to
call infection control have her come and do something about this smell."
Ir. 29, line 23 - p. 30, line 18.
Lesia called Jodi Alverson and left a message for her to check out the odor. Patient's
families were coming in and complaining of the smelly odor. Tr. 30, line 20 - 25. Lesia was
starting to get a headache from it. Tr. 31, lines 16-17. Then prior to lunch, Jodi came in and
talked to maintenance and told Lesia they needed to transfer the elderly woman in Room 7 to
Room 19. Tr. 31, line 22 - p. 32, line 15.
Just prior to lunchtime, a second odor, "like rotten eggs," started emanating from the
drain trap in the kitchen, two doors further down the hall. One of the kitchen staff came out and
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was pretty upset because of the stink. Tr. 43, lines 9 - 23. Joyce Fogg, one of the nurses on staff,
recalled the egg smell that day. She testified that it was a strong smell that would have been by
the nurse's station. In fact, she only noticed it in the nurse's area. Exh. 24, JF Deposition, p. 11,
line 17 - p. 12, line 19; p. 16, lines 1 - 11.
2. The medical records and witness testimony prove that Lesia Knowlton had
immediate respiratory symptoms resulting from her exposure.
The medical records corroborate Ms. Knowlton's respiratory issues. Laira Thomas initial
visit notes three days after the exposure on September 15,2000: "She comes in today
complaining of cough, sore throat, burning when she takes a deep breath." Exh. 5, p. 13. She saw
Dr. Thomas Pryor two weeks after the incident on September 25, 2000: "She had some problems
with coughing at the time and developed progressive coughing and hacking, which has persisted
since that time .... The cough is so severe any time she increases her respiratory rate, she cannot
function .... On exam no distress, she just gets into severe hacking, coughing fits ... The lungs have
some bronchitis-like sounds to them, but no focal findings. There is some increased expiratory
phase noted. Some scattered ronchi, but no wheezes." Exh. 9, p. 5.
Lesia Knowlton and three other witnesses all testified that her voice was hoarse. Joyce
Fogg, a nurse at the hospital testified that she noticed that Lesia's voice was hoarse after that
day, but not before then. Exh. 24, JF Deposition, p. 14, lines 3 - 6.
Lesia's husband, David, came home to find Lesia lying on the couch. He said:
" ... you could hear pneumonia, you could hear gurgling in her chest ... The day before,
very upbeat and going. I mean, just herself. Not sitting still. I knew something was wrong
when I came home that day that it happened and she was laying on the couch. Because
she was never home that early in the day .... She was white and pasty. Like sweaty. And
when she'd breathe or try to talk, she couldn't talk she was hoarse. And when I got over
next to her, you could hear the breathing was wheezing. It was really labored .... Very,
very difficult for her to breathe." DK deposition, p. 10, line 19 - p. 11, line 19.

Claimant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 6

Lesia's father came over to Lesia's home that day. He said, "Well, she was on the couch
when we got there. And, you know, wheezing. She couldn't hardly breathe. She said she had her
lungs bumt ... She had, you know, glassy eyes, watery eyes, yeah. Was wiping them .... She could
kind of [talk], like a whisper." WDG deposition, p. 15, line 9 - p. 16, line 3.
Although another defense witness, Karen Exon, wasn't working on September 12,2000,
she testified that after that date, she noticed a change in Lesia's voice. She described it as soft,
hoarse and raspy. Exh. 25, KE Depo., p. 17, line 13 - p. 19, line 2.

n
LESIA KNOWLTON CONTRACTED RADS
AS A RESULT OF HER INHALATION INJURY
A. The medical records support the conclusion that Lesia Knowlton contracted
Reactive Airway Disease Syndrome "RADS" as a result of her inhalation injury.
Wikipedia defines RADS as follows:

"Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome or RADS (also known as Reactive Airway
Disease or RAD) is a term proposed by S.M. Brooks and colleagues in 1985 to describe
an asthma-like syndrome developing after a single exposure to high levels of an irritating
vapor, fume, or smoke. In time, however, it has evolved to be mistakenly used as a
synonym for asthma.
It can also manifest in adults with exposure to high levels of chlorine, ammonia, acetic
acid, sulphur dioxide, creating symptoms like asthma. The severity of these symptoms
can be mild to fatal, and can even create long term airway damage depending on the
amount of exposure and the concentration of Chlorine. Some experts classifY RADS as
occupational asthma."
1. RADS was diagnosed by three (3) treating physicians.
Lesia Knowlton was diagnosed with RADS by three (3) treating physicians: Dr. Ronald
Fullmer, Dr. Richard Henry, and Dr. Holly Carveth. Each of these physicians also related her
RADS symptoms to the occupational exposure.
Lesia Knowlton saw Dr. Fullmer in October, November and December following her
exposure. In his 11120100 Assessment, Dr. Fullmer noted that the reduction in airflow measured
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on spirometry exam could have some reactive airways dysfunction syndrome.Exh. 2, p. 11.
When asked in his deposition if smoking could explain Lesia Knowlton's spirometry exam
results, Dr. Fullmer responded that the results were more indicative ofRADS:

"Q: What effect would smoking have on these tests?
A: Smoking could cause the reduction in the FEF 25-75. But if it was, for example, early
emphysema-related smoking, I wouldn't expect to see the significant improvement after
the bronchodilator, which she did have. That is more suggestive of reactive airways
disease like asthma or Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome or something like that."
RF Depo., p. 33, lines 2 - 11.
Dr. Fullmer referred Lesia to Dr. Richard Henry, an allergist, who saw her a week later
on December 27, 2000. Dr. Henry's impression was:
"1. Reactive airways dysfunction syndrome suggested by history. At this point she seems
to have heightened nonspecific hyperreactivity of her upper and lower airways. Although
prior history does not suggest prior atopy, she does have a brother with asthma and hay
fever and is therefore at higher risk for developing asthma. From her history, there
appears to be an initial occupational contribution and now an ongoing occupational
aggravation when exposed to hospital chemicals (disinfectants, cleaning agents, etc.)
2. Tobacco abuse, minimal." Exh. 10, p. 2.
Ms. Knowlton was then seen by Dr. Holly Carveth, a pulmonary specialist at University
of Utah Hospital. She sees many cases ofRADS every year. HC Depo., p. 30, line 13 -14 Ms.
Knowlton was treated at the University of Utah Hospital by Dr. Holly Carveth from January 9,
2001 through August 3,2004. Dr. Carveth diagnosed Lesia Knowlton's condition as RADS. She
said the symptoms may improve "over months to years." Lesia underwent a Methacholine
Challenge Test, in which her FEV 1 dramatically declined to 69% of predicted. Dr. Carveth
noted that this test was abnormal, which supported the diagnosis. Exh. 17, p. 3

2. Multiple Methacholine Challenge Tests Corroborate the RAnS Diagnosis.
The eleven (11) Methacholine Challenge Tests taken by Lesia Knowlton over a six year
period consistently show that Lesia Knowlton suffers from RADS, irritant induced asthma. All
of the tests are consistent and show a moderate degree of airway hyperresponsiveness. Exh. 18
Claimant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Recousideration 8

All of them, even according to defense expert, Dr. Munday, showed that she as in the "low end
to moderate reactivity." Tr. p. 165, line 16 - p. 166, line 9. Dr. Munday agreed that Lesia
Knowlton's tests showed a 20% drop on multiple occasions.
" ... they look for a 20 percent drop from the baseline testing and what they do is they
keep giving a higher dose until either get to a 20 percent drop or they reach the maximum
dose. In the case of Mrs. Knowlton, she did have a positive test in that she did have a 20
percent drop and as it said multiply - on different occasions, they were in the same
general range and they were all up in the moderate range." Tr. p. 151, lines 8 -15.
Dr. Carveth testified that the test administered on January 9, 2001 showed her lung
capacity had a "dramatic decline to 69% of predicted." Exh. 17, p. 3
Dr. Carveth testified about how difficult it would be to falsify these test results, especially
in light of the repeatedly consistent results over the years. She testified:
" ... the Defendant's expert at the hearing testified that those kinds of tests can, from time
to time, have false positives. I don't know whether you agree with that, but my question
to you is, would it be reasonable to assume that she would have 10 to 11 false positives
over the period of time that she was taking those tests?
A: It's difficult to have a false positive pulmonary function test, but not absolutely
impossible. The measures that they take to ensure that it's an accurate study is by having
the patient make maximal efforts. And by making it maximal, it should be reproducible.
It should be the same every time. And they need to reproduce at least three that are the
same before they accept it.
And when you add the bronchoprovocation, then it adds a second layer of testing
because they, again, have to reproduce it three times exactly the same. And that would be
very difficult to do because her results were actually remarkably reproducible over that
number of years.
So I think that makes it les likely that it would have been an inaccurate study.
Q: Okay. I just wanted to make sure that you understood there were five studies that were
done at the University of Utah, but the other five or six were done elsewhere. And if they
showed similar results, would that - what would you say about an expert who then says,
"Well, they could have all been false positive"?
A: It seems unlikely. I have access to the ones that were done at the University of Utah
over that time and they were very reproducible." HC Depo., p. 23, line 1 - p. 24, line 10
The evidence of these repeated Methacholine Challenge Tests is compelling, and was
never challenged.
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3. The Spirometry test conducted by Dr. Fullmer excludes a diagnosis of preexisting asthma, and confirms the RADS diagnosis.
The Spirometry results actually excluded a diagnosis of pre-existing asthma independent
ofRADS. When coupled with the compelling Methacholine Challenge Tests, the results confirm
that Lesia Knowlton's chronic asthma symptoms are a component ofRADS.
Both the Spirometry test and Methacholine Challenge Test start with a baseline
spirometry. But in the spirometry test, a bronchodilator is introduced to open the bronchial tubes
and measure the improvement in air capacity, while in the latter, methacholine, a chemical
irritant, is introduced that induces bronchospasm. RADS is a medical condition in which the
person has airway hyperreactivity to irritants. As Dr. Carveth described: "RADS is an irritant
reaction in the airway that's different than asthma, that includes inflammation, airway
hyperresponsiveness, that may be long term." HC Depo., p. 15, lines 6 - 9
Here is how Dr. Fullmer differentiated between the two tests.
" ... we had her come back for spirometry, pre and post-bronchodilator spirometry, which
is a pulmonary function test that measures how much air she can blow and how fast she
can blow it. And that's how we look for asthma or other kinds oflung disease, it's one of
the tools.
Q: Is this different than Methacholine Challenge Test?
A: Yes, it is. Methacholine Challenge is a spirometry testing. But instead of using a with pre and post-bronchodilator spirometry, that's a basic routine everyday tool that
pulmonologists, allergists, family practice, internal medicine doctors use spirometry in
their offices to screen for lung disease or to monitor a person's asthma or something. And
with pre and post bronchodilator spirometry, we do a baseline spirometry and measure
how much a person can blow. And then we give them a bronchodilator medicine that
opens up their bronchial tubes and we measure again, have them repeat the test. And if
they have at least a 15 percent or more improvement in some of the numbers, then that's
suggestive of asthma. And whereas a Methacholine Challenge test, the person has
baseline spirometry, and if it's - there's some limitations where you don't want to do a
Methacholine Challenge test. But, basically, you do a baseline spirometry, then you give
them progressive challenges of methacholine, which is a -it's a drug that can induce
bronchospasm even in normal people in high enough concentration. People with asthma
are more sensitive and will have a 15 or 20 percent change in their numbers at a lower
level of methacholine than a normal person will. And there's defined thresholds for
what's considered abnormal as far as having reactive airways. So it's basically more of a
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provocation test where you're inducing bronchospasm." (RF Depo., p. 23 , line 4 - p. 24,
line 18.)
If Lesia Knowlton had a lung disease or severe asthma that reduced her lung capacity at
all times, when she took the first Spirometry test, the baseline results and the improvement with
bronchodilation would have disclosed it. Instead, the results showed that her problem was not her
baseline lung capacity, which was normal. RF Depo., p. 27, line19 - p. 28, line 24. The
Methacholine Challenge Tests showed that Ms. Knowlton's problem was reduction in air flow
with the introduction of irritants, which corresponds with a diagnosis of irritant-induced asthma,
RADS. The Spirometry results corroborate the subsequent Methacholine Challenge Test
findings.

4. Lesia Knowlton's history, symptoms, examinations, diagnoses and tests satisfy
all of the eight (8) diagnostic criteria for RADS.
The defense presented a list of eight (8) diagnostic criteria for RADS, but did not make
the claim that all of these criteria had to be present in order to make the diagnosis. Nonetheless,
Ms. Knowlton's history, symptoms, medical records and tests satisfy all eight (8) criteria.
Dr. Carveth, a medical expert in the diagnosis of RADS, testified that, "Typically not all
of the criteria have to be met for a diagnosis." HC Depo., p. 112, line 23 - p. 113, line 3.
Dr. Carveth diagnosed Ms. Knowlton's RADS condition not for purposes of this
litigation, but as a clinician for the purpose of treating her.. In doing so, she used her extensive
medical skills and training with that singular goal in mind. Dr. Carveth gave this personal
definition ofRADS:
"It's a clinical diagnosis versus a specific test that you can make that clinches it, which,
of coUrse is part of the reason that we're here. It relates to a toxic irritant exposure,
typically with immediate symptoms, that the person often can relate the specific date and
time that it occurred. Should be followed soon after by symptoms that can relate to the
airway, could be in the chest, could be in the throat. Symptoms tend to be chest tightness,
cough, shortness of breath. And over time, the prominent symptoms can be a repeat of
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those same cough, shortness of breath symptoms, either with exposure to non-specific
irritants even in small amounts or triggers for asthma. And the other component is that
the patient should not have had predisposing asthma .... A methacholine challenge test
that's positive can be helpful." He Depo., p. 51, line 12 - p. 52, line 2.

Criteria 1.
The Defendant argued that Lesia Knowlton didn't meet the first diagnostic Criteria for
RADS because she had "prior respiratory complaints." The only evidence of such a complaint
was in November, 1988. As noted above, Dr. Fullmer noted only that she had "occasional mild
dyspnea with running after her brother." She was not treated for any respiratory condition prior
to the exposure on 9/12/00.
Moreover, the defense expert, Dr. Munday, testified that this criteria has been
abandoned. He testified that a person may have other preexisting conditions and still be
diagnosed with RADS. Tr. p. 146, lines 8 - 25.

Criteria 2.
The Defendant conceded that Lesia Knowlton's description of the exposure and onset of
symptoms met Criteria 2.

Criteria 3.
Criteria 3 required an irritant in high concentration. However, the defense expert, Dr.
Munday, admitted that this criteria has now been broadened to include both "a high level
exposure that was initially used for RADS or lower levels, more prolonged exposures." Tr. p.
146, lines 15 - 19.
The exposure level was satisfied because there was evidence that the fumes were present
in high concentration. Dr. Carveth testified that the acid taste in Lesia's mouth, severe cough and
burning in her throat, together with general illness, was proof that the fumes were present in
sufficiently high concentration to cause her airway injuries. HC Depo., p. 57, line 5 - 8. Dr.
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Fullmer testified that Lesia reported an acid taste in her throat and he said that the acid taste
could be indicative of a sulfuric acid exposure, and that the symptoms of such exposure could be
mostly airway symptoms or mostly eye irritation. RF Depo., p. 16, line 4 - p. 17, line 22. Dr.
Fullmer's office note of October 13, 2000 indicates that Lesia Knowlton also complained of
severe nasal burning. "She did have some initial burning in her nasal passages with the exposure
but this has since resolved." Exh. 2, p. 9. Dr. Henry's medical records also note that Lesia had
"itchy, watery eyes" and "nasal congestion." Exh. 10, p. 1 Nurse Joyce Fogg, a defense witness,
testified there was a strong rotten egg smell by the nurse's station. Exh. 24, JF Depo, p. 11, Line
17 -po 12, line 19.
The MSDS Sheet for Biotron indicated that the toxic level of that chemical was a very
small amount -- one milligram per cubic meter, which is less than a drop in a 250 gallon barrel.
Tr. p. 195, lines 21 - 25.
Lesia's father, Warren Gorringe, testified that when he saw Lesia at her home the day
after the exposure she had "glassy eyes, watery eyes. She was wiping them." WG Depo., p. 15,
line 25 - p. 16, line 1.
Criteria 4.

Criteria 4 requires the onset of symptoms within 24 hours after exposure and persisting
more than three months. As Dr. Carveth testified, to make the clinical diagnosis, the physician
looks for the immediate onset of airway symptoms, such as chest tightness, cough and shortness
of breath. Lesia Knowlton had those symptoms from the day ofthe exposure. Defendant's
expert, Dr. Munday testified that Lesia Knowlton met this Criteria:
"So, she clearly met the time period and her description of the potential initial exposure,
as well as the onset of symptoms, clearly occurred within 24 hours of exposure, there is
no doubt about that whatsoever." Tr. p. 147, lines 14-18.
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Criteria 5.
Criteria 5 requires symptoms simulating asthma. The Defendant argues that Lesia
Knowlton did not have all of the symptoms of asthma, but at the same time argues that she had
pre-existing asthma. This is internally inconsistent. The evidence shows that Ms. Knowlton did
not have any pre-existing asthma, but after her exposure, contracted all of the symptoms of
irritant-induced asthma.
Defense expert, Dr. Stephen Munday, testified that:
"RADS, as I think I said earlier, is just a subset of asthma and so you get the same
symptoms as someone with asthma gets, which is subjectively they can complain of
shortness of breath, on examination they typically would be wheezing. They can cough.
Absolutely ... RADS - the only difference between RADS and any other asthma is just the
proposed mechanism of onset of the condition." Tr. p. 168, lines 4-14.
Dr. Munday testified that her medical records did not show "wheezing" that would
support the RADS diagnosis. Tr. p. 170, line 19 - 24. However, Lesia Knowlton's medical
records show that she did have 'wheezing.' The Gooding County Hospital note of November 11,
2000 states that she presented "to the ER complaining of increasing wheezing and cough for Y2
hour." Ex. 16, p. 2 Lesia's husband, David Knowlton, described Lesia's physical condition
when he saw her on the evening of September 12, 2000. He said:
"She was white and pasty. Like sweaty. And when she'd breathe or try to talk, she
couldn't talk, she was hoarse. And when I got over next to her, you could hear the
breathing was wheezing. It was really labored. Like when Davy had that RSV virus.
Very, very difficult for her to breathe." DK depo, p. 11, lines 13 - 19.
She also reported dyspnea to Dr. Fullmer on her initial visit on October 13,2000. His
office note states: "She currently describes dyspnea on exertion with walking only about 50
feet." Exh. 2, p. 8.

Criteria 6.
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Criteria 6 is "possible airflow obstruction shown in pUlmonary function tests." (Def.
Brief, p. 13) Dr. Fullmer's impression was that the spirometry test performed on November 11,
2000 indicated "mild to moderate reduction in flow rates .... this might suggest some mild
reversible obstruction/asthma." Exh. 2, p. 13. All eleven (11) Methacholine Challenge Tests and
each subsequent spirometry test showed airflow obstruction. As Dr. Carveth pointed out, it is not
unusual for a person suffering from RADS to have a normal pulmonary function test "at rest."
The obstruction is apparent when an irritant is introduced. He Depo., p. 59, line 19 - p. 60, line
7. She also testified that a normal baseline pulmonary function test (PFT) can indicate that the
RADS problems are from the upper airway. She testified:
" ... 1 think a lot of people aren't aware that vocal cord dysfunction can be a part of
RADS. And they - they might be fooled if baseline PFTs are normal and yet someone is
having shortness of breath at the time. Because it could be from their upper airway." HC
Depo., p. 113, lines 10 - 14.

Criteria 7.
Criteria 7 is a positive Methacholine Challenge test. Lesia Knowlton had eleven (11) tests
that have all shown abnormal results corroborating a diagnosis ofRADS.

Criteria 8.
Criteria 8 is that other pulmonary disease is ruled out. Dr. Fullmer testified that Lesia
Knowlton had no prior history of pulmonary problems.
"When you saw Mrs. Knowlton in October 2000, did she have any prior history of
pulmonary problems?
A: Well, not according to my note then. She stated she'd otherwise been in good health.
And no other symptoms I can recall at that time, preexistent symptoms." RF Depo., p.
53, lines 3-11.
Dr. Munday testified that Lesia Knowlton had no prior diagnosis of asthma.
''Now, do the records that - the medical records that you reviewed for Mrs. Knowlton
show any - were there ever any indications in the record that she had any asthmatic
condition or asthma prior to September 12, 2000?
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A: Well, there has never been any records that I have seen anywhere that gave her a
diagnosis of asthma, so I would agree with that statement." Tr. p. 166, lines 10- 16.
Ms. Knowlton met all eight (8) diagnostic criteria for RADS.
5. Dr. Fullmer concurred with Dr. Carveth's opinion that Ms. Knowlton could
have a long term RADS diagnosis.

Dr. Ronald Fullmer opined that Lesia Knowlton's symptoms were related to sulfuric acid
inhalation exposure. He wrote:
"Her initial diagnosis was an inhalation injury secondary to sulfuric acid exposure. The
patient was thought to have some upper airway and nasopharyngeal irritation related to
the inhalation exposure. This was manifest by some discomfort in her throat, a cough,
some hoarseness, and burning sensation in her upper chest with deep breathing .... These
symptoms were probably related to the sulfuric acid inhalation exposure." Ex. 2, p. 17.
Although Dr. Fullmer said that the duration of the injury should be no more than four to
six weeks, he clarified that answer in his deposition. Dr. Fullmer was talking about Lesia's acute
injury. He felt that the "initial severe symptoms would progressively improve over four months."
By that time, the patient would be left with residual symptoms and be chronic and stable. RF
Deposition, p. 26, Ll. 3 - 10.
Dr. Fullmer concurred with Dr. Carveth's statement that Ms. Knowlton could have a long
term RADS diagnosis. He testified:

"Q: What did the fact that her shortness of breath was improving show to you?
A: Well, that would be consistent with Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome. I mean,
usually with that, you expect the person to progressively improve. And, you know,
hopefully in no longer than about four to six months, they should hopefully be back to
their baseline. If they don't return to baseline and they still have wheezing and shortness
of breath, then that suggest one of two things, either they have underlying asthma that
was exacerbated by their inhalation exposure or that the inhalation exposure actually
induced chronic asthma." RF Depo., p. 26, lines 15 - p. 27, line 3.
He went on to testify:
Q: If Dr. Carveth expressed the opinion that she felt that Lesia Knowlton's condition
could persist for months or years, her RADS condition, would you agree or disagree with
that?
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A: Oh, I agree with that. That's what I was saying is that the majority of people who have
inhalation injury are going to recover without permanent sequelae. But a small fraction of
patients do go on to have persistent chronic obstructive airways disease or asthma
problems." RF Depo., p. 51, lines 7 -17.
Dr. Fullmer opined that Lesia Knowlton's hoarseness was indicative ofRADS. He said:
"Q: My question is, up above, where you talk about her problems with her voice and she
gets hoarse with exposure to smoke, perfume and strong odors, could that be indicative or
a component ofRADS, the sensitivity to those odors?
A: Yeah, I think it probably could be. People who are - well, anybody who's got reactive
airways disease, whether its asthma or Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome, many
of them are going to be sensitive to any kind of irritants, smoke, dust, perfume, strong
odors, cleaning agents. I mean, that's just common symptoms with that." RF p. 53, line
24 - p. 54, line 11.

6. Defense expert, Dr. William Wallace, excluded all possibility that allergies
caused Lesia Knowlton's RADS respiratory irritant-induced asthma symptoms.

The defense hired Dr. William Wallace, an allergist, to conduct a battery of allergy tests
on Mrs. Knowlton. Dr. Wallace determined that Lesia Knowlton had no allergies. WW Depo., p.
17, line 23 - p. 18, line 10. Given the negative results of all of the allergy skin tests, Dr. Wallace
did not order any further tests on Mrs. Knowlton because he felt they already had sufficient
negative information and had answered the question as to whether allergies explained Mrs.
Knowlton's symptoms. They did not. WW Depo., p. 20, line 23 - p. 21, line 8.
Dr. Wallace reviewed the records of Dr. Holly Carveth in which she diagnosed Lesia
Knowlton with RADS and the possibility of vocal cord dysfunction. He agreed that there was
nothing in his fmdings or testing that would contradict her findings. He also agreed that the
symptoms ofRADS can include coughing, wheezing and shortness of breath, and that ifLesia
Knowlton had RADS, she would not need an allergy to anything in order to have those
symptoms. WW Depo., p. 23, line 24 - p. 24, line 16.
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Dr. Fullmer also testified that people can have "intrinsic asthma," which he defined as
being more sensitive to chemicals and irritants in their environment, smoke, or cleaning agents,
without having allergic asthma. Dr. Fullmer agreed that these symptoms are common in p~rsons
who have contracted RADS. RF Depo., p. 40, line 7 - p. 41, line 8. Dr. Fullmer said:
" ... where you talk about her problems with her voice and she gets hoarse with exposure
to smoke, perfume and strong odors, could that be indicative ofRADS, the sensitivity to
those odors?
"A: Yeah, I think it probably could be. People who are - well, anybody who's got
reactive airways disease, whether its asthma or Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome,
many of them are going to be sensitive to any kind of irritants, smoke, dust, perfume,
strong odors, cleaning agents. I mean, that's just common symptoms with that.
Q: Do you see a lot of cases ofRADS?
A: A fair number." RF Depo., p. 53, line 24 - p. 54, line 13.
Defense expert, Dr. Munday, also testified that RADS is just a subset of asthma. The only
difference is the mechanism of onset. Tr. p. 168, lines 4 - 14.

m
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT
THE OPINIONS OF DEFENSE EXPERTS
A. Dr. Stephen Munday's testimony had no scientific foundation in the medical
evidence and was given undue weight by the referee.
The Referee adopted the opinions of defense expert, Dr. Stephen Munday, who opined
that the cause of Lesia Knowlton's RADS symptoms was pre-existing GERD and asthma. He
offered this opinion in the absence of any prior diagnosis of either condition; in the absence of
any pre-existing symptoms; in the face of immediate symptoms and objective test results that
confirmed the diagnosis of RADS resulting from exposure to a toxic irritant; and contrary to the
medical findings and opinions ofLesia Knowlton's treating physicians.
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In Dr. Munday's opinion, Lesia Knowlton had GERD, that was entirely asymptomatic
prior to the chemical exposure on September 12, 2000, which he claims accounts for all of her
respiratory symptoms, even after it was entirely controlled in 2004. He testified:
"Well, GERD is a very interesting disease, because people can have GERD and not know
that they have it, because there may not be any obvious symptoms." Tr. p. 144, lines 1416.
Dr. Munday admitted that Mrs. Knowlton had never been diagnosed with GERD prior to
the chemical exposure.
"And prior to this -the incident of September 12, 2000, were there any medical records
that showed that Lesia Knowlton had GERD?
A: I didn't see anything that said she had GERD." Tr. p. 166, lines 17 - 20.
The first mention ofGERD in any of Lesia Knowlton's medical records is on January 9,
2001 when she was seen at the University of Utah Hospital by Dr. Holly Carveth. Exh. 17, p. 1
From September 12,2000 to that date, Lesia Knowlton was seen by Laira Thomas, nurse
practitioner, Dr. Thomas Pryor, Dr. Ron Fullmer, the ER physicians at Gooding County
Memorial Hospital, and Dr. Richard Henry. She did not report symptoms of GERD to any of
these medical providers, nor is it reported in any of their medical records.
We also know from the January, 2001 laryngoscopy results that there were no objective
signs of GERD four months earlier on September 12, 2000, because there were no objective
fmdings of scarring or lesions when the laryngoscopy was performed. Exh. 17, p. 15, 17.
Lesia Knowlton did not have any symptoms of GERD, asthma, or any other pulmonary
condition prior to her exposure to toxic chemicals on September 12,2000. Those facts are not in
dispute. No treating physician has concluded that GERD can account for all of Lesia Knowlton's
respiratory symptoms. In fact, Dr. Fullmer and Dr. Carveth both have testified that RADS does
account for all of her symptoms, but GERD cannot account for Lesia Knowlton's respiratory
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symptoms. No treating physician could have diagnosed Lesia Knowlton with GERD on
September 12, 2000 because she had no symptoms or objective evidence of it.
It is impossible to rebut the testimony of an expert who claims that the evidence that a

medical condition exists is the absence of any physical evidence that it exists. But that is the
burden of proof that the Referee imposed on the Claimant. Ms. Knowlton presented undisputed
facts about the exposure, compelling medical testimony and records that substantiate the
diagnosis ofRADS and its causation from this exposure, as well as the testimony of 16 other
witnesses to her condition pre and post the exposure that corroborate Ms. Knowlton's testimony
and the medical evidence. But the Referee required more. He required her to prove an impossible
negative -- that she did not have completely asymptomatic GERD, a disease without any
physical symptoms or signs, prior to her exposure on 9/12/00.
All that the Claimant can do in light of this impossible evidentiary burden is note that
there is no scientific basis for Dr. Munday's opinion. It does not meet the evidentiary standards
for a medical expert opinion. It cannot be tested. It cannot be proven. It is therefore not scientific
evidence and it should have been stricken. Rule 703 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence requires
expert opinion testimony to be based on "facts or data" "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in fonning opinions or inferences upon the subject ... " As the Court
held in Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (Idaho
2007):
"Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the
record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and, therefore, is
inadmissible as evidence. Bromley, 132 Idaho at 811, 979 P.2d at 1169. The Court has
not adopted the Daubert standard for admissibility of an expert's testimony but has used
some of Daubert's standards in assessing whether the basis of an expert's opinion is
scientifically valid. See Swallow v. Emergency Med. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589,595 n. 1,
67 P.3d 68, 74 (2003) ("this Court has not adopted the Daubert test for admissibility").
The Daubert standards of whether the theory can be tested and whether it has been
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subjected to peer-review and publication have been applied, but the Court has not
adopted the standard that a theory must be commonly agreed upon or generally accepted.
Compare Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786,
2796-97, 125 L.Ed.2d 469,482-84 (1993) with Merwin, 131 Idaho at 646, 962 P.2d at
1030.
Thus "[t]he question under the evidence rule is simply whether the expert's
knowledge will assist the trier of fact; not whether the information upon which the
expert's opinion is based is commonly agreed upon." Merwin, 131 Idaho at 646, 962 P.2d
at 1030. The Court stated that a scientific study does not have to be universally accepted
in order for experts to validly use the study as a basis of opinion. ld. The focus of the
court's inquiry is on the "principles and methodology" used not the conclusions they
generate.ld (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. at 2797, 125 L.Ed.2dat484).
When an "expert's opinion is based upon scientific knowledge, there must likewise be a
scientific basis for that opinion" because if the reasoning or methodology underlying the
opinion is not scientifically sound, then the opinions would not assist a trier of fact.
Swallow, 138 Idaho at 592, 67 P.3d at 71.

B. Defense expert, Dr. Craig Beaver, did not dispute the RADS diagnosis or
attribute all of Lesia Knowlton's RADS symptoms to anxiety.
1. Dr. Beaver's opinions were based on faIse factual assumptions.
Dr. Beaver acknowledged in his deposition that Lesia Knowlton had no prior history of
depression, no prior diagnosed mental health disorder, no neurocognitive difficulties and no drug
or alcohol issues before the exposure on September 12,2000. CB Depo., p. 52, line 19 - p. 54,
line 2. From the records he reviewed, Dr. Beaver did not see any indication that the stresses and
anxieties in her life had ever caused Lesia Knowlton any kind of problems at home or at work.
CB Depo., p. 55, lines 3 - 7.
Nonetheless, the defense postulated that Lesia Knowlton's initial onset of symptoms on
September 12, 2000 was due to psychological factors -- emotional difficulties she was having in
a custody fight with her ex-husband over custody of her children. CB Depo., p. 12, lines 9-14.
However, there was no evidence to support that claim. Lesia's breathing problems started on
September 12, 2000. She did not discover the physical abuse of her children and become
involved in a custody fight with her ex-husband until two years later. Bobbie Hobbs, who also
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had a child with Lesia's ex-husband, testified that it was in 2002 that they both discovered the
abuse of Lesia's girls and Bobbie's son. That was when they jointly initiated court proceedings
for custody. Exh. 49, BH Depo., p. 9 - 10.
The other emotional events referred to by Dr. Beaver, the death of Lesia's sister in April,
2001, her father's heart attack that same year, and the death of her brother in 2006 also cannot
account for her shortness of breath or coughing spells commencing eight months earlier in
September, 2000.

2. Dr. Beaver agreed that RADS could be the cause of Lesia Knowlton's breathing
problems.
Contrary to the Referee's finding, Dr. Beaver acknowledged that "some of the time or a
lot of the time," Lesia Knowlton's breathing problems could be triggered by reactive airway
disease rather than anxiety. He could not apportion those events as to causation, and only
testified that "some episodes are triggered by emotions" because that is how RADS works. He
testified:

"Q: Did she tell you what she felt was the onset or the trigger that she understood caused
or started the breathing episodes?
A: Well, from her perspective, she always felt that the breathing problem came on first
then she got nervous and anxious about it.
Q: Okay.
A: And I'm not saying that couldn't be true some of the time or a lot of the time, but she
really would not acknowledge that it ever was the other way around.
Q: Okay
A: And she could have the most clearly verified physiological reactive airway disease
problem where nobody would disagree that she had that severely, but some of the
episodes that she's going to have are triggered by her emotions. That's just the way that
disorder works. She had a hard time acknowledging that could be the case." CB Depo., p.
50, line 17 - p. 51, line 11.
Dr. Carveth's opinion was that being unable to breathe produces anxiety and that anxiety
worsens airway tightness and difficulty with breathing. When asked whether she observed
anxiety in Lesia around the time of the death of Lesia's sister in 2001, Dr. Carveth said: "I think
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you're looking for sort of free floating anxiety. I saw anxiety related to her cough symptoms, her
throat symptoms." HC Depo., p. 110, lines 9 - 24.
Dr. Beaver admitted that it would not be abnonnal for Ms. Knowlton's inability to
breathe to cause her to have anxiety about suffocation.
Q: If, in fact, you have a case where a person has a breathing episode as she described,
for whatever the cause, would it be abnonnal for that person to become anxious and to be
panicked over their inability to breath and feeling like they were suffocating?
A: No.
Q: SO, the fact that she was having that response, whatever the original cause, wouldn't
put her in an abnonnal category, would it, psychologically?
A: No." CB Depo., p. 50, line 9 - p. 52, line 2
Lesia' husband, David Knowlton, best described what he observed on a regular basis as
the genesis of Lesia' s breathing episodes.
"Before she went to Dr. Carveth, if she was exposed to something, it was, you know, it
was a lot of anxiety along with the fact she couldn' t breathe. And she would just almost
pass out. And she' d completely lose her voice for a half a day to a day, minimum. And
Dr. Carveth, she was the one that showed her how to relax and so she could take her
medication and how to work her voice so she would not lose it, but a couple of hours
later, she'd get it back. And I don't know how long it takes her to get it back now. But
before that, it was like a drowning victim . .. every time she'd get exposed to anything that
would irritate her throat and her voice, everything would start shutting down. You know,
it would start like restricting. And she couldn't get enough air. And it was panic, just like
a drowning victim would be. She' djust start shaking, turn white, scared to death. And
she just - it was like she was going to pass out ... . She really thought she was dying. One
of these times, she wasn't going to come through." DK depo., p. 18, lines 3 - 14; p. 19,
lines 6 - 13; p. 50, lines 5-6.
The claimant has always acknowledged that there is a component of anxiety in her
breathing problems. But that anxiety is the result of her disability, not its cause. As Dr. Holly
Carveth testified:
"Vocal cord dysfunction and anxiety often are interlinked.
Q: Okay: And would you hold yourself out as qualified to diagnose and consult regarding
anxiety or other maybe psychological or psychiatric issues?
A: I think I'm qualified related to the interaction between vocal cord dysfunction, asthma
and anxiety.
Q: As far as it's physical manifestations, I would assume?
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A: Yes. As well as having these disorders feed back and can worsen anxiety. Patients
who are short of breath become anxious." HC Depo., p. 68, line 19 - p. 69, line 6.
After spending two days interviewing Lesia Knowlton, Dr. Beaver concluded that she
was open, honest and sincere about her physical condition. He noted:
"Do you think in evaluating her over the two days that you saw her that she was open and
honest and sincere about what she was telling you, that she sincerely believed what she
was telling you about her physical condition?
A: Yes, I think she believed it, as best I could tell." CB Depo., p. 58, lines 4 - 10.

IV

THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
The referee made a number of factual findings that are at odds with the record.

Finding #4."In a 2003 deposition, Claimant first recalled that she worked from just after
8:00 a.m. until 11 :30 p.m. She described in detail taking a meal break about 7 :00 p.m.
and noticing that her lungs burned as she took deep breaths in the cold outdoor air. By the
date of hearing, after reviewing documents, she recalled that she worked only until about
4:00 p.m."
Ms. Knowlton's testimony at the hearing on June 20, 2008, eight years after the day in
question, was that she didn't recall, not that she "only" worked until 4:00 p.m. Moreover, she
testified she was on a 12-hour shift that started a little after eight that morning, and therefore
would have ended no earlier than 8:00 p.m. Tr. p. 28, lines 2-5.

"Q: Okay. And so how long were you at your post while the smell was continuing and the
fans were pushing it towards you?
A: I honestly don't remember today what time I left work that day. I do know that in my
injury report it said I was there until 16:00 hours, which would have been 4:00 p.m. I also
have a copy of my schedule for that day and it said I was on a 12 hour shift. So, at the
very least until 4:00, 4:30 that afternoon." Tr. p. 35, lines 20-25.
Lesia Knowlton testified at the hearing that she was exposed to fumes for about eight
hours. That is consistent with the Report of Injury, Exh. 1, as well as her statements to treating
physicians, Laira Thomas, FNP, Ex. 5, p. 8; Dr. Fullmer, Ex. 2, p. 8; Dr. Carveth, Ex. 17, p. 1.
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Finding #13."On October 25,2000, Nurse Thomas prescribed Wellbutrin at Claimant's
request to help her stop smoking."
Laira Thomas's note referenced in this finding is as follows: "Has continued to quit
smoking since her chemical exposure back in September. Is wanting to try some Wellbutrin."
Ex. 5, p. 14. She quit smoking following the exposure as noted in Dr. Thomas Pryor's office note
on September 25,2000. Exh. 9, p. 1 "She is a reformed smoker, but has quit since the incident."
Although there is no evidence in the record that Ms. Knowlton ever smoked after the
incident, the Referee makes this finding:

Finding #18."In the weeks and months after the exposure ... Incongruously, she
occasionally smoked cigarettes while driving but reported no breathing or other problems
when doing so."
Finding #22."Claimant inconsistently reported her smoking habits after the exposure."
If these findings were true, they are so important that it is inconceivable that they would
not appear in the Defendant's Post Hearing Brief. But they do not. The reason is that Ms.
Knowlton only testified that at the time of the incident she was still smoking minimally. She
never testified that she continued to smoke after the exposure, and her medical records reflect
that she quit smoking when it occurred. In her 2004 deposition, she testified (LK Depo., p. 204,
lines 6-13):

"Q: Okay. At that time you were smoking?
A: Some, yes.
Q: Did you take a cigarette break?
A: Nope. I never smoked at work. I only smoked when I drove. It took me a week and a
half to go through a pack of cigarettes. It was just a driving vice, and only if I didn't have
any kids in the car with me."

Finding #24."In deposition, treating physician Ronald Fullmer, M.D. opined Claimant's
symptoms were inconsistent with exposure to inhaled sulfuric acid. He considered GERD
to be the more likely cause. He considered differential diagnoses of mild asthma and
anxiety to be more likely than reactive airways dysfunction syndrome. He opined that the
onset of increasing symptoms in the weeks after the exposure was more likely evidence
of a psychological component. He held to his opinions expressed in his medical records
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in 2000. Dr. Fullmer explained his reasons underlying his opinions. Given the Claimant
the benefit of any possible doubt, he opined Claimant became medically stable form any
possible inhalation injury within six weeks of the exposure."
The Referee's rmding was that Dr. Fullmer concluded that Lesia Knowlton did not
have RADS as diagnosed by Dr. Carveth. That is not accurate. Dr. Fullmer concurred with
Dr. Carveth's diagnosis ofRADS. He testified:

"A. Well, she did see an occupational pulmonary medicine at the University of Utah also,
Dr. Carveth, and had a pretty extensive exam there . And she, basically, it sounds like,
carne to the same conclusions, that she had Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome.
And then also, you know, paradoxical vocal cord motion, which can pretty much mimic
signs and symptoms of asthma. It's - and so that's the only other, as far as an expert
opinion from a person specifically related to occupational exposures, that I'm already
aware of." RF Depo., p. 47, lines 14 - 24.
He went on to say: " ... most of what I read in Dr. Carveth's notes pretty much agreed
with most of the things I thought was going on with the lady." RF Depo., p. 50, lines 17-20.
Dr. Fullmer said that the duration of the injury should be no more than four to six weeks;
however, he clarified that answer in his deposition. Dr. Fullmer was talking about Lesia's acute
injury. He felt that the "initial severe symptoms would progressively improve over four

months." By that time, the patient would be left with residual symptoms and be chronic and
stable. RF Deposition, p. 26, lines 3 - 10. He also admitted that he couldn't determine if Ms.
Knowlton had any permanent impairment or restrictions because he didn't see her after
December, 2000. RF Depo., p. 46, lines 13 - 14. He said: "Well, without any follow-up on the
patient, it's kind of hard to do that."
As noted in Subsection II.A.(5) above, and contrary to the Referee' s finding, Dr. Fullmer
reported: "Her initial diagnosis was an inhalation injury secondary to sulfuric acid exposure."
Ex. 2, p. 17. Contrary to the fmding, Dr. Fullmer testified that odor intolerances and persistent
asthma problems could be related to the sulfuric acid injury and could not be caused by GERD.
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RF Depo., p. 44, line 25 - p. 45, line 14. He also testified that her bronchodilator test results were
not indicative of the effect of smoking or any neuromuscular disorder. He testified: "That is more
suggestive of reactive airways disease like asthma or Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome
or something like that." RF Depo., p. 33, lines 4-11.

Finding #26. "She opined Claimant's vocal cord dysfunction was related to anxiety and
acid reflux."
This fmding is inaccurate. Dr. Carveth's January 9,2001 Assessment related Ms.
Knowlton's vocal cord dysfunction to the toxic inhalation. She noted only that there was a
component of severe anxiety that induced spasm and worsened dyspnea. "Her second problem
appears to be paradoxical vocal cord motion or laryngospasm. This also appears related to the
toxic inhalation. Now, there is a component of severe anxiety which induces the vocal cord
spasm and worsens her dyspnea. This problem has been described in the past related to sulfuric
acid exposure." Ex. 17, p. 3.
In her deposition, Dr. Carveth testified that acid reflux can produce or aggravate vocal

cord dysfunction. But in Ms. Knowlton's case, examination did not show any permanent scarring
of the vocal cords that would have resulted from severe acid reflux. Dr. Carveth opined that Ms.
Knowlton had a functional impairment consistent with RADS. HC Depo., p. 72, line 24 - p. 73,
line 6; p. 74, line 4 - p. 77, line 2.
On March 20,2001, Dr. Carveth notes reflect that even after Ms. Knowlton's acid reflux
was controlled, she continued to suffer from laryngospasm, which Dr. Carveth testified was a
known component ofRADS. Ex. 17, p. 19; HC Depo., p. 10, lines 10-13.

Finding #27. "William W. Wallace, M.D., specializes in allergy immunology .. He opined
she exhibited no allergic reaction to any of the potential allergens for which he tested:
pollens, dander, etc. He opined she had no allergies related to possible sulfuric acid
exposure."
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This finding is an accurate statement but incomplete and misleading. Dr. Wallace found
that Lesia Knowlton did not have any allergies. He also testified that she did not need to have
any allergies in order to have RADS or its asthma-like symptoms, and his findings did not
contradict Dr. Carveth' s RADS diagnosis.
"If Ms. Knowlton was diagnosed with RADS and the possibility of vocal cord
dysfunction, is there anything in your findings or testing that would contradict that
diagnosis?
A: No, sir.
Q: Okay. And the symptoms ofRADS, to your knowledge, they can include coughing
and wheezing and shortness of breath."
A: Absolutely.
Q: And would you have to have an allergy to something in order to have those symptoms
if you had RADS?
A: You do not." WW Depo., p. 24, lines 4-16.

Finding #28. " ... Claimant's history does not meet the criteria for a diagnosis ofRADS."
As noted in Subsection II.A.(4). above, Ms. Knowlton met all eight (8) criteria for a
diagnosis of RADS.
Parenthetically, in this finding, Dr. Munday is reported as having opined that the
Claimant did not suffer from asthma. If the Referee adopted that finding, it is inconsistent with
the conclusion that pre-existing asthma caused or contributed to causing Ms. Knowlton's RADS
symptoms.

Finding #29. "Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D .... opined inhalation exposure was not the
predominate cause of Claimant's symptoms initially and was not a probable cause of her
later-appearing symptoms. He attributed her later-appearing symptoms as probably
psychologically, not physically, caused. He opined that asthma was known to be related
to somatization and that Claimant developed a "conditioned relationship" of exhibiting
symptoms as a result of emotional distress, anxiety, and depression, all of which stemmed
from a naIve personality."
As rioted in Subsection III.B.(1) above, Dr. Beaver's conclusions as to causation are
highly suspect because he based them on false assumptions. He opined that Ms. Knowlton's
initial symptoms were the result of her anxiety over a custody dispute that he assumed was
Claimant'll Memorandum iu Support of Motion for Reconsideration 28

ongoing in September, 2000, when in fact, it didn't occur until two years after the symptoms
arose.
As noted in Subsection III.B.(2) above, Dr. Beaver did not opine that Ms. Knowlton's
symptoms's were primarily the result of anxiety and depression. Contrary to the Referee's
fmding, Dr. Beaver acknowledged that "some of the time or a lot of the time," Lesia Knowlton's
breathing problems could be triggered by reactive airway disease rather than anxiety. He could
not apportion those events as to causation, and only testified that "some episodes are triggered by
emotions" because that is how RADS works.

Findings #30 - 33. "Credibility - Claimant."
The Referee refers to inconsistencies in Ms. Knowlton's testimony, but does not point out

any specific facts to which we can respond. In referring to other witnesses, Finding #35 states
that testimony from the 16 other witnesses about Claimant's breathing, vocal or other symptoms
was deemed credible. However, it does not appear that much if any weight was given to the
testimony of all of these witnesses, who corroborated the Claimant's own story of the exposure,
her resulting symptoms, and its physical effects on her for the past eight years.
Finding #36. "Causation ... The exposure itself is problematic ... No other co-workers
were reportedly harmed in any way"
The evidence presented on the issue of Claimant's exposure was undisputed. Ms.
Knowlton was the only person next to a fan blowing the fumes at her nurse's station all day.

Finding #37. "Among the clinical criteria required for a RADS diagnosis are the
"documented absence of preceding respiratory complaints ... very high concentrations [of
chemical irritant, and] ... onset of symptoms occurred within 24 hours after the exposure
and persisted for at least three months." Each of these factors is equivocal or absent from
the medical records of treating physicians."
As noted in Subsection II.A.(4) above, Ms. Knowlton met all eight (8) criteria for a
diagnosis of RADS.
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Finding #38. "Dr. Munday's thorough report and testimony was persuasive. No external
chemical, whether sulfuric acid or another irritant, could likely have caused Claimant's
lung and throat symptoms without first significantly burning her eyes and nose .... he
explained how GERD was more consistent than chemical inhalation. Dr. Munday also
explained why GERD was the likely cause of Claimant's cough and burning sensation in
her lungs and throat."
Finding #39. "The opinions of treating physician Dr. Fullmer and expert toxicologist Dr.
Munday are consistent with each other. Together, they establish that Claimant's exposure
on September 12, 2000 did not cause any symptoms or condition which would have
reasonably required medical care."
The weight given by the Referee to Dr. Munday' s testimony is unwarranted because it
was not based on scientific or medical evidence, but pure speculation that the Claimant had a
completely asymptomatic condition of GERD. She developed the cough and burning sensation in
her lungs and throat immediately following the exposure on 9/12/00, but had no symptoms of
GERD until at least four (4) months later, and even six (6) months after the exposure, had no
signs of scarring of the vocal cords indicative of severe GERD.
Nor are the opinions of Dr. Munday and Dr. Fullmer consistent. As noted above in
Subsection II.A.(5) Dr. Fullmer concurred with Dr. Carveth's RADS diagnosis. In addition, he
opined that Ms. Knowlton could have suffered sulfuric acid inhalation injury without significant
burning of her eyes or nose.
"I suppose one person could have mostly airway symptoms and another could have
mostly eye irritation or both. But I'm not sure it's exclusive that a person is going to have
both." RF Depo., p. 17, line 16-20.
He also noted:
"Well, a month after exposure, even if she did have chemical burns or injuries to her
nasal pharynx, oropharynx, that would probably have mostly healed and resolved by that
time .. Whether she had significant mucosal injury early on, I don't know, because I didn't
examine her at that time." RF Depo., p. 20, line 13-20.
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Dr. Carveth also testified she had seen cases of significant lower respiratory
inflammation from irritant exposure without major eye or upper respiratory symptoms. HC
Depo., p. 64, lines 7-24.
CONCLUSION
The findings of fact and conclusions of law are not based on substantial competent
evidence and do not support the order. The Claimant met her burden of proof in this case and the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order should be reversed.
Dated: November 19,2009.

&-:2) V
Christ T. TroupiT
Attorney for Claimant
Leisa Knowlton
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY certifY that on November 19,2009, I caused to serve a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Claimant's Memorandum in support of Motion For Reconsideration in the above
referenced case by fIrst class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, and by electronic mail upon the following:

Matthew Pappas
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
POBox 7426
Boise,ID 83707-7426

Christ T. Trou is
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C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
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Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
Alan K. Hull, ISB No.: 1568
Matthew O. Pappas, ISB No. 6190
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COME NOW, the Defendants, Wood River Medical Center, and the Idaho
Insurance Guaranty Association, successor in interest to Fremont Compensation
Insurance Group, by and through the undersigned Counsel of record, and hereby
submit Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case came on for hearing before the Industrial Commission on June 20,
2008.

On October 16, 2009, the presiding Referee Issued Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law. By way of an Order dated November 3,2009, the Commission
approved, confirmed, and adopted the Referee's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, determining pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, the decision was final and
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated.
On November 19, 2009, Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the
grounds that the Commission made several errors of fact involving causation,
Claimant's subsequent symptoms and expert opinions. Claimant fails to identify any
errors of law. The matter is now before the Commission for determination.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Industrial Commission is not required to construe facts liberally in favor of
the worker when evidence is conflicting. Aldrich v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho
361, 363, 834 P.2d 878 (1992)(citing Bennett v. Bunker Hill Co., 88 Idaho 300, 305,
399 P.2d 270 (1965}).

The purpose of a reconsideration is to provide a more

definitive format for valuable legal critique. The Industrial Commission will not re-
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weigh evidence and arguments simply because the case was not resolved in the
claimant's favor. The intent is to provide a more definitive format for valuable legal
critique but discourage reactionary and insubstantial motions when a disgruntled party
merely wants the Commission to "think it over again." The Industrial Commission's
finding and decision must be upheld if supported by substantial and competent
evidence.

Revas v. K.C. Logging, 134 Idaho 603, 607, 7 P.3d 212 (2000).

Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion. Reaves v. K. C. Logging, 134 Idaho at 607.

The

Commission is the fact finder, and its conclusions on the credibility and weight of
evidence will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Reaves, 134 Idaho at
607.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
Claimant's November 19, 2009, Motion for Reconsideration, essentially
requests that the Industrial Commission re-weigh and re-interpret evidence or "think it
over again" simply because the case was not resolved in Claimant's favor.
Interestingly, the arguments presented in Claimant's Memorandum are nearly identical
to those expressed in her excessive Reply Brief prior to the decision.

As the

Commission knows, Defendants objected to Claimant's Reply Brief and asked that it be
stricken from the record due to Claimant's failure to conform with the briefing page
limits under J.R.P. Rule 11 (A). The Commission chose to forego ruling on the Motion
to Strike in light of the ultimate findings on the case.
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I.

The Industrial Commission's Decision is Supported by Substantial and
Competent Evidence.
It is the province of the Industrial Commission is to determine the weight and

credibility of testimony and to resolve conflicting interpretations of testimony. Spencer
v. AI/press Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P.3d 475 (2000). Essentially, at its core,

Claimant's argument is that the presiding Referee should ignore the plain and
established facts as well as the "law of the case" and extrapolate, presume, abstract,
and speculate while engrafting secondary medical opinions to reach a conclusion that
Claimant's testimony was credible and that her experts' opinions outweigh those of
world renown specialists. This proposed approach is, in and of itself, unreasonable
and clearly transgresses the main goal of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law.
Claimant's purported grounds for the instant Motion for Reconsideration are
nothing more than a request for the Commission to re-weigh the evidence and "think it
over again" because the case was not resolved in Claimant's favor.

The presiding

Referee and ultimately the Commission acted in accord with the factual and legal
dictates of worker's compensation law and found accordingly.

In effect, Claimant

requests that the Commission ignore the "law of the case" doctrine and extrapolate
unsupported inferences from the record. Conversely, Defendants believe the presiding
Referee made a well-reasoned decision based upon the weight of the evidence
specifically presented by Claimant and issued a decision accordingly. As such, the
presiding Referee's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations were
well-substantiated in both law and fact and therefore not clearly erroneous. Therefore,
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the October 16, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation as
well as the November 3, 2009, affirming Order are supported by substantial and
competent evidence and should not be set aside upon reconsideration.

A.

The Evidence Established that Claimant's Symptoms Were Not
Related to an Alleged Inhalation Exposure

Claimant's initial argument on reconsideration is a claim that the evidence
showed that her alleged symptoms were caused by the potential chemical exposure on
September 12, 2000, and she continues to dispute the GERDs diagnosis and its
relationship to her actual symptoms. Notwithstanding the fact that Claimant does not
offer any new evidence or testimony other than what was submitted during and after
the hearing, she continues to ignore the fact that one of main reasons she failed in her
assertions was her own lack of credibility. Claimant does not raise any new issues of
law that mandate that her interpretation of the facts should prevail over the Industrial
Commission's Decision.
Claimant suggests that there was no evidence of pre-existing asthma or GERDs
to account for her symptoms after the alleged exposure on September 12, 2000. She
points to the record, which is somewhat sparse with respect to her medical history
prior to the incident in question.

Focusing on that, she contends that no medical

records detailing pre-existing conditions means there could not have been a preexisting problem. This, of course, ignores the fact that subsequent testing showed
that Claimant's GERDs condition, even though diagnosed after the fact, had advanced
to a stage that it had to pre-exist her alleged exposure.
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Obviously, her problems had not risen to a level to cause her to seek medical
care. Unfortunately, her symptoms worsened at the same time she allegedly was
exposed at the workplace.

It was this incident that brought her condition to the

forefront. As mentioned previously, Dr. Munday's testified that minor cases of GERDs
may not always be obvious to the patient until they become severe. He noted that
GERDs is often discovered when the offending stomach acid makes its way into the
respiratory tract, causing "asthma like symptoms.

II

(Hearing Tr., pp. 144-145). Dr.

Munday clarified that the exact nature of Claimant's symptoms (throat irritation,
cough, metal taste in her mouth) more closely resemble issues with GERDs as opposed
to an exposure to an airborne irritant. Id.
Claimant cannot and does not explain why she had a lack of any upper
respiratory or other mucous membrane irritation (nose or eyes) that would have been
indicative of an exposure.

Later on in her argument, she attempts to point to

testimony from her husband that she was having problems with her eyes. However,
this testimony came after the testimony of many of the experts involved and seemed
to be a stop gap effort to circumvent the fact that the record was devoid of any of
these type of symptoms prior to incident.
Claimant refers to a number of notations and statements made by Drs. Carveth
and Fullmer in their notes and post-hearing depositions as proof that she did not have
any pre-existing issues with asthma or GERDSS. Unfortunately, both of these doctors'
testimony were tempered by the fact that they were relying on extremely subjective
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and selective information provided to them solely from Claimant.

Both of these

doctors were told by Claimant that she had been exposed to sulfuric acid. They had
no other independent information, other than what Claimant was telling them, as to
what had happened on September 12, 2000. Again, the trier of fact is placed in a
position where they need to make a judgment call as to a witness's credibility. Sorry
to say, Claimant's credibility or lack thereof was her own worse enemy and raised
many questions about what really happened on September 12, 2000.
This is further borne out by the fact that it was questionable whether Claimant
was exposed to harmful levels of any chemical at all. Claimant's memorandum next
references a claim that the evidence undisputedly showed that a toxic exposure
occurred. Claimant suggests that co-worker testimony couple with the "immediate"
onset of her symptoms established that she was exposed to sulfuric acid. She totally
discounts the fact that the testimony only showed that other co-worker's noticed a
strange smell. This hardly proves she was exposed to dangerous levels of a particular
chemical.
Instead, the Referee and the Industrial Commission chose to rely upon the
expert testimony of a specialist trained in recognizing and treating toxic exposures.
Again, the issue of Claimant's specific symptoms following the alleged exposure work
to her detriment. It was addressed ad nauseam at hearing and in the post-hearing
depositions that it was impossible to suffer a significant exposure to airborne sulfuric
acid without having serious irritation of the face and eyes. Claimant's coughing fits,
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raspy voice and subsequent skin and odor intolerances simply did not correspond to
the type of exposure she was alleging.

Claimant has presented no new facts to

counter this issue.
The substantial and competent evidence before the Commission established that
Claimant was not exposed to significant levels of any toxic chemical to produce the
symptoms she alleges.

Claimant's own actions after the alleged exposure coupled

with her transient, subjective and across the board symptoms only served to eat away
at her own credibility. There is no legal or factual basis for the Industrial Commission
to overturn its decision in this respect.

B.

Claimant's RADS Diagnosis is Suspect and Unrelated to her
Alleged Inhalation Exposure

Claimant's second argument asserts that the evidence shows she "contracted
RADS" as a result of an inhalation injury. Interestingly, Claimant's argument in her
brief for reconsideration is an almost exact reproduction of the arguments expressed in
her Reply Brief filed during the post-hearing period. Defendants already objected to
most, if not all, of the content of this brief due to the fact that it was submitted in
violation of the briefing requirements set forth under the Judicial Rules of Procedure.
Nevertheless, the arguments espoused by Claimant ask the Commission to focus on
the methacholine challenge testing and spirometry done over the course of her
treatment to justify her RADS diagnosis.

Claimant again makes an argument with

respect to causation, suggesting the alleged exposure led to her development of RADS.
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Defendants have already addressed the subjectivity of the testing involved in
Claimant's treatment. Test results can be skewed by lack luster effort on the part of
the participant. Additionally, the testing along cannot stand by itself to justify a RADS
diagnosis. Again, GERDs became a more reasonable diagnosis when the totality of
Claimant's symptoms are considered. Normal pulmonary spirometry testing results
occurring at the same time as mild to moderately reactive methacholine challenge tests
are not indicative of a person truly suffering from a sulfuric acid exposure. Instead,
that individual would be expected to have significantly positive spirometry testing.
Obviously, having only severe GERDs like symptoms with no lung damage is not
consistent with RADS. (Hearing Tr., pp. 168-169).
The significance of Dr. Fullmer's and Dr. Carveth's diagnosis of RADS should be
tempered against the fact that they were receiving purely subjective information from
Claimant regarding the exposure and the development of her symptoms afterwards.
Both doctors acknowledge the imperfect nature of methacholine challenge testing and
their own loose application of the RADS diagnosis criteria. Obviously, focusing on the
criteria was not their primary concern.

Instead, they were attempting to treat an

individual that claimed she was suffering from ever worsening symptoms that failed to
resolve after an extended period of time. Dr. Fullmer clearly could see that there was
not much more he could do for Claimant after a few months, after which he basically
washed his hands of her care.
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Claimant's own belief that she had suffered an exposure led her to shop around
until she found another source of treatment, which led her to Dr. Carveth. Dr. Henry is
He was not a specialist in toxic exposure and his involvement in

an anomaly.

Claimant's treatment was so minimal, that it hardly could be seen as significant
enough to carry much weight . Dr. Carveth made clear during her deposition that she
had to rely entirely upon Claimant's own version of what had happened and the
doctor's role was limited to medical treatment, as opposed to investigation and
diagnosis. All involved noted they would defer to a specialist in toxic exposure .
Claimant next tries to imply that because Defendants' expert Dr. Wallace
concluded that Claimant was not suffering from any allergic reactions as a result of an
alleged exposure, then RADS was the only possible explanation for her ongoing
symptoms. Dr. Wallace was consulted solely to conduct allergy testing, to attempt to
stretch his diagnosis (or lack thereof for allegeries) to show support for Claimant's
RADS claims is incredulous. The primary lesson we learned from Dr. Wallace is that
Claimant is not credible. He totally disputed all of Claimant's assertions that she was
suffering from numerous allergies as the result of an alleged exposure. Instead, he
showed that she was not reactive to any substance that tested for.

C.

The Evidence Supported the Opinions of the Defense Experts

Claimant next attacks the opinions and foundation for such of Defendants'
experts, Dr. Munday and Dr. Beaver. It is interesting that Claimant waited until her
Motion for Reconsideration to raise these arguments, instead of at the time of hearing
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or their post-hearing depositions. Claimant suggests that Dr. Munday had no scientific
foundation for his opinion that pre-existing conditions or other issues could account for
her symptoms.

She also asserts that Dr. Beaver's opinions were based upon false

factual assumptions and could have been attributable to her RADS diagnosis. Totally
ignoring the fact that Claimant is again asking the Commission to rehash the same
evidence, Defendants suggest to the contrary. Doctors Munday and Beaver had more
information and facts available to them than any of Claimant's "experts" and they
were able to develop their opinions based upon the entire medical and psychological
history of Claimant, unlike Claimant' s experts who were limited to extremely subjective
information.
Turning first to the foundational arguments raised by Claimant, Defendants
contend that Claimant failed to raise her objections to the testimony of Drs. Munday
and Beaver in a timely manner, and as a result, thereby waived their right to raise
these new objections at this early date . It is a long standing tenet of Idaho case law
that a failure to object to evidence when introduced is a waiver of objection that it is
inadmissible.

Naccarato v. Priest River, 68 Idaho 368, 373 (1948).

Evidence

introduced without objection stands as evidence in the case for all purposes. Angelus

Securities Corp. v. Chester, 128 Cal.App. 437, 17 P.2d 1016; Hamlin v. University of
Idaho, 61 Idaho 570, 574, 104 P.2d 625. And the same is sufficient to support a
finding. Powers v. Board of Public Works, 216 Cal. 546,15 P.2d 156. To now raise
the argument that the testimony and opinions of these experts is dubious. Claimant
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had both of these experts' opinions long before the hearing and could have objected to
their foundation prior to the presentation of their testimony. To raise this issue at this
late date warrants the denial of Claimant's request.
Turning to the opinions themselves, Claimant argues that the conclusion made
by Dr. Munday that Claimant was suffering from pre-existing GERDs has no scientific
basis.

She asserts that since there are no records showing GERDs like symptoms

before the accident, it is impossible for her to be suffering from it before its later
diagnosis. As with her prior arguments, Claimant ignores the fact that her symptoms
more closely resemble the condition of GERDs instead of the RADS diagnosis that she
pushes. She asks the Commission to rely upon the untrained opinions of a number of
Claimant's acquaintances who testified about her physical condition prior to the
alleged exposure. Claimant suggests that she is faced with an insurmountable task of
proving a negative. Unfortunately, she had every opportunity to prove her case and
her evidence was not convincing.
As a threshold proposition, any opinion testimony offered by either a lay or an
expert witness must be based upon competent, factual evidence.

If a sufficient

factual foundation is established, the opinion can be considered. Theonnes v. Hazen,
37 Wash. App. 644, 681 P.2d 1284 (1984), cited with approval, Ryan v. Beisner,
123 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct. App. 1992). Dr. Munday's background,
combined with his overall review of the medical records and depositions taken of
numerous individuals, concluded that the facts showed Claimant was suffering from
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GERDs at the time of her exposure. Without the upper respiratory or other nasal or
eye symptoms, there was no way to conclude there was an exposure leading to
RADS.

Dr. Munday possessed the necessary "specialized knowledge" required to

substantiate the opinions identified in his report and testimony. The Idaho Court of
Appeals has made clear that expert testimony is clearly admissible when the expert's
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence and to
determine a fact in question. State v. Dragoman, 130 Idaho 537, 944 P.2d 134 (Ct.
App. 1997).
What Claimant describes as her inability to prove a negative is actually indicative
of the problems that her RADS diagnosis and why it does not fit with her overall
theory of the case.

Claimant tries to twist the opinions of Dr. Beaver in a similar

manner and argue that since he identified certain traumatic events in her life, he relied
on false assumptions as to her present condition.

Instead, Dr. Beaver actually

considered these events, coupled with Claimant's entire experience from the date of
the alleged incident to the present to formulate his opinions as to how stress affects
her personal life.
Claimant has missed the point with respect to Dr. Beaver's opinion. Although
Dr. Beaver concluded that a person suffering from RADS could have anxiety related
breathing issues, he did not ultimately concur in Claimant's RADS diagnosis. To him,
Claimant's anxiety was the prime issue, and he felt that was due to totally unrelated
triggers than the potential exposure. Dr. Beaver identified, and the Commission rightly
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agreed, that Claimant's emotional problems were deeply rooted in conditions in no way
related to her alleged exposure.
D.

The Findings of Fact are Supported by the Evidence

l
Claimant s final argument upon reconsideration asked the Commission to
reweigh the evidence with respect to a number of specific findings. Most, if not all, of
the questions of fact identified by Claimant as errors on the part of the Referee were
influenced heavily by Claimant's overall credibility. Claimant is asking the Commission
to take as gospel truth selective portions of her testimony, when it was clear that
Claimant was not the best historian, often had a skewed view of history and many
times didn't accurately portray her condition to her medical care providers. This is
most obvious in the errors Claimant assigned to the findings regarding her ongoing
smoking habitl which was significant because this clearly could have an effect on her
ability to breath. The Referee was correct to identify that Claimant was unclear about
her smoking habits and often failed to accurately respond to her medical providers
about her smoking status.
Claimant attempts to argue that because many of the findings made by the
Referee were not addressed in Defendants' initial briefing, the Referee overstepped his
bounds by making his own conclusion. UnfortunatelYI this argument is overshadowed
by the fact that Defendants conformed with the briefing page limits and requirements
outline in the Judicial Rules of Practice and was forced to hit the major issues. There
is no question that if Defendants had been afforded an additional 30 pages, these
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questions would have been brought to light. The Referee astutely picked up on the
fact that there were great discrepancies between Claimant's testimony at her two
depositions and hearing about the timing of the accident. The same can be said about
Claimant's smoking habits.
The weight given to the various experts and their differing opinions with respect
to the RADS diagnosis versus GERDs is again improperly raised in this stage in the
proceedings . Dr. Fullmer was not as supportive of Claimant's case as they may lead
the Commission to believe.

Defendants objected to Claimant's attempts to elicit

opinions from him about her current condition when asked at his deposition. He did
not have the entire file, and in fact only had a very small portion of the record. As a
result, it is not surprising that his testimony, although supportive of Claimant, was not
given much weight since he obviously was not fully apprised of all of the facts. Dr.
Carveth was also in a similar position. She even questioned Claimant's motives when
we discussed the letters submitted by Claimant in support of her Social Security claim
for benefits. Claimant did a disservice to herself by not providing her experts with the
full record. Industrial Commission decisions are replete with precedent that medical
opinions premised on incomplete, inaccurate, selective or mistaken information are
unpersuasive, unreliable, and cannot satisfy the requisite burden of proof. Cotsford v.

Specialty Construction Systems, 2001 IIC 0771, 0777 (2001); Santos v. Simplot,
2000 IIC 0294, 0297 (2000); Nelson v. David L. Hill Logging, 1995 IIC 0314, 0318

(1995); Bolkcom v. Friendly Fred's of Nampa, Inc., 1995 IIC 0070,0078 (1995); Kato
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v. Lamb- Weston, Inc., 1 991 II C 0472, 1 481 (1 991 ); Cadward v. Gem Gunite Pools,
1987 IIC 0576,0579 (1987).
To the contrary, Defendants' experts had access to the entire gamut of the
medical reports, depositions and other sources of information related to Claimant's
case. It is not surprising that the Referee came to the same conclusion as Defendants'
experts when he was faced with the full record. The Referee experienced in person
Claimant's presentation and a supposed reaction to perfume on a blouse borrowed
from a family member. It was interesting to see how this alleged reaction seemed to
wax and wane during the hearing, depending upon the source of questioning and the
topics covered.
The Referee had the benefit of observing Defendants' primary expert witness
testify live at hearing. He participated in the questioning of Dr. Munday and explored
the same themes that were addressed in the final opinion.

He had available the

impeaching documents from Claimant's Social Security file. He was able to review
Claimant's significant post incident work as an EMT. In the end, without the benefit
of corroborating eye-witness testimony or other similarly effected employees, the
Referee made a judgment call, clearly within his discretion as to Claimant's credibility,
the onset of her symptoms and the relationship of those symptoms to the incident.
Ultimately, she was found to lack credibility. Claimant has presented no new facts or
identified significant errors of law that warrant overturning the well-reasoned decision
of the Referee.
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CONCLUSION

The Referee's October 16, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation as well as the Industrial Commission's November 3,2009, affirming
Order are supported by substantial and competent evidence. At its basis, Claimant's
request for reconsideration is nothing more than a plea for the Commission to re-weigh
evidence and "think it over again" in a manner which would be wholly inconsistent
with its prior decisions and contrary to controlling precedent. Based on the foregoing
argument and authority, Defendants respectfully request the Industrial Commission
deny Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration.
If necessary,

~ants

request oral argument on the matter.

DATED this __ day of December, 2009.
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP

By:
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Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant,
vs.

WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
And

FREEMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC No.: 00-030269

CLAIMANT'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT
TO IDAHO CODE §72-718

COME NOW, the above-named Claimant, Lesia Knowlton, by and through her
attorney' s of record, R. Brad Masingill and Christ T. Troupis, and submits the following Reply
Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order entered by the
Commission in this case on November 3, 2009.
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m
0

I

NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUBSTANTIATE
THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE CLAIMANT'S
SYMPTOMS WERE RELATED TO PRE-EXISTING GERD
The Defendant asserts without citation to any evidence in the record that "subsequent
testing showed that Claimant's GERD condition, even though diagnosed after the fact, had
advanced to a stage that it had to pre-exist her alleged exposure." Def. Brief, p. 5. The
Defendant's conclusion is contrary to all of the medical evidence in the record.
Four months after the exposure, Leisa Knowlton's airway and vocal cords did not show
any injury from GERD acid, which would have been present if she had severe GERD at the time
of the exposure. Dr. Carveth Depo., p. 113, lines 21 - p. 114, line 15.
"What significance is there, or maybe there isn't, in the clinical note assessment on page
60, of Exhibit 1, where the statement is made, "They did not notice acid injury to her
vocal cords"? Do you remember that?
A: Uh-huh (Affirmative). And we discussed that a little bit. And I think in that - that was
a - a direct visualization of her vocal cords done by the Vocal Cord clinic the day after I
saw her. And she was having some GERD symptoms at the time, but they didn't actually
see injury. So GERD to a significant enough degree to cause injury.
But the acid I was discussing was GERD acid and not sulfuric acid.
Q. Okay. If she would have had severe GERD prior to that time, would there have been
some evidence of injury, acid injury, to her vocal cords at that time?
A: If it was severe, I would have expected they could have seen something."
"You said something about there was no finding of GERD in that examination by
Marshall Smith .... what is the significance of that?
A: Precisely what we discussed, that she had GERD symptom, but there weren't fmdings.
So that told me GERD, if present, was probably not severe." Dr. Carveth depo., pg. 114,
line 24. - p. 115, line 9.
Both Drs. Fullmer and Dr. Carveth testified that the acid taste in Leisa's mouth could be
indicative of exposure to chemical fumes. Dr. Fullmer depo., p. 16, lines 4-10; Dr. Carveth
depo., p. 57, lines 5-8.
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Contrary to the medically unsupported claim of Dr. Munday that undiagnosed and
asymptomatic GERD explained Leisa Knowlton's symptoms better than her undisputed
exposure to chemical fumes at work, every one of Leisa Knowlton's treating physicians
concluded that her symptoms were related to toxic exposure to chemical fumes at work.
Laira Thomas, FNP noted in her Assessment, "Cough possibly related to chemical
exposure at work." Exh. 5, p. 13.
Dr. Thomas Pryor's diagnostic assessment was "toxic exposure to sulfuric acid,
accidental, with secondary bronchitis. Exh. 9, p. 5.
Dr. Ronald Fullmer's initial diagnosis was "an inhalation injury secondary to sulfuric
acid exposure." Exh. 2, p. 16. In his 10113/00 Assessment, he noted: "It is likely that she suffered
some upper airway and perhaps even some laryngeal and tracheal chemical injury .... She could
have a reactive airways dysfunction syndrome which is basically an asthma like syndrome of
bronchospasm which may follow inhalation exposure either to smoke or chemicals." Exh. 2, p.
10. He also testified in deposition that Lesia's odor intolerances, persistent asthma symptoms and
laryngeal and vocal cord problems could be related to the sulfuric acid injury. He said:
"So I think those kind of symptoms might still be related to the sulfuric acid injury."
"Q: Right. Could GERD also cause the same symptoms and problems?
A: Probably not." Dr. Fullmer depo., p. 45, line 9 - 14.
Dr. Fullmer concurred with Dr. Carveth's expert opinion that Leisa Knowlton had
acquired Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome from her exposure to chemical fumes at
work. He testified:
"She did see an occupational pulmonary medicine at the University of Utah also, Dr.
Carveth, and had a pretty extensive exam there. And she, basically, it sounds like, came
to the same conclusions, that she had Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome. And then
also, you know, paradoxical vocal cord motion, which can pretty much mimic signs and
symptoms of asthma. It's - and so that's the only other, as far as an expert opinion from a
person specifically related to occupational exposures, that I'm aware of."
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Dr. Fullmer depo, p. 47, line 14 - 24.

Dr. Richard Henry reached the same conclusion, recorded in in his 12/27/00 note:
"1. Reactive airways dysfunction syndrome suggested by history. At this point she seems
to have heightened nonspecific hyperreactivity of her upper and lower airways. Although
prior history does not suggest prior atopy, she does have a brother with asthma and hay
fever and is therefore at higher risk for developing asthma. From her history, there
appears to be an initial occupational contribution and now an ongoing occupational
aggravation when exposed to hospital chemicals (disinfectants, cleaning agents, etc.)
2. Tobacco abuse, minimal." Exh. 10, p. 2.
Drs. Fullmer and Carveth also noted that irritation of the nose and eyes was not a
necessary component of a chemical fume inhalation injury sufficient to cause RADS.

"Q: Now, based upon your understanding, this was an exposure to fumes or kind of an
aerosolized version of the chemical?
A: Well, all she did - 1 mean, there was no description of any gas or color, you know, any
kind of colored gas or fumes or smoke or any other kind of - basically, she described an
odor."
Q: Right.
A: 1 did say fumes, but 1 don't recall that she actually described, you know, some kind of
floating mist or anything like that. 1 think it was mostly odor.
Q: Doctor, would you expect an exposure such as that to also have some effect on the
eyes and nose?
A: It could.
Q: Would you be surprised if the effect was limited solely to the upper airway?
A: I'm not sure that would be predictable. 1 mean, I suppose one person could have
mostly airway symptoms and another could have mostly eye irritation or both. But I'm
not sure it's exclusive that a person is going to have both." Dr. Fullmer depo., pg. 16, line
22 - p. 17, line 20.
Dr. Carver testified:
"1 can't specifically address sulfuric acid. 1 have seen some cases come to the lCU with
irritant exposures, significant lower respiratory inflammation without major eye, upper
respiratory symptoms.
Q: Okay.
A. So that the lower airway is quite sensitive.
Q: Okay. And That's in a situation with a lower or a minor exposure in that case?
A: No. Probably significant." Dr. Carveth depo, p. 64, line 14 - 24.
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LEISA KNOWLTON'S SPIROMETRY TEST RESULTS
CORROBORATED THE RADS DIAGNOSIS
AND EXCLUDED PRE-EXISTING ASTHMA
OR LUNG DISEASE
Leisa Knowlton had spirometry tests with a normal baseline lung capacity, as well as
eleven (11) Methacholine Challenge Tests that were positive for RADS. Contrary to the defense
claim, these spirometry test results corroborate the RADS diagnosis. A spirometry test measures
the baseline lung capacity; then a bronchodilator is introduced to increase that capacity. In the
presence of lung disease or asthma, the normal baseline will be reduced and the bronchodilator
will counteract the reduction in lung capacity. Leisa Knowlton's spirometry tests showed a
normal baseline proving that she did not have any pre-existing asthma or lung disease that would
have reduced her baseline lung capacity.
The Methacholine Challenge Test serves an entirely different purpose of diagnosing
RADS in a person without pre-existing lung disease or asthma. In a Methacholine Challenge
Test, the baseline lung capacity is established; then a Methacholine Irritant is introduced into the
lungs. If the person has hyperreactivity to the Methacholine Irritant, a reduction in lung capacity
will result. Leisa Knowlton had eleven (11) Methacholine Challenge Tests administered at the
University of Utah Hospital and St. Luke's. All of them showed that when the irritant was
introduced, her lung capacity was markedly diminished, confirming the RADS diagnosis. As Dr.
Carveth testified:
"RADS is an irritant reaction in the airway that's different than asthma, that includes
inflammation, airway hyperresponsiveness, that may be long term." HC depo, p. 15, line
6-7.
"It's not unusual to be normal at rest. Therefore, you need the methacholine challenge
study." Dr. Carveth depo, p. 60, line 2-7
Claimant'. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Rec:onsideration 5

m
THE REFEREE GAVE UNDUE WEIGHT
TO THE OPINIONS OF DEFENSE EXPERTS
THAT WERE WITHOUT SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION
AND NOT BASED ON THE FACTS
The Claimant has objected to the weight given to the GERDS' opinion of Dr. Stephen
Munday because that opinion is not based on medical facts in the record, or any accepted
scientific theory. The defense claims that this is a new objection raised in this motion for
reconsideration. However, the same objection was made verbatim in the Claimant's Reply
Memorandum in response to the Defendant's citation of Dr. Munday's opinions. At page 21 of
the Reply Memorandum, the Claimant stated:
"It is impossible to rebut the testimony of an expert who claims that the evidence that a
medical condition exists is the absence of any evidence that it exists. All that we can do is
note that there is no scientific basis for such an opinion. It does not meet the evidentiary
standards for a medical expert opinion. It cannot be tested. It cannot be proven. It is
therefore not scientific evidence and it should be stricken."

In Page v Mccain Foods, 179 P.3d 265 (ID 2008), the Court held:
"The Court may set aside an order or award by the Industrial Commission if: (1) the
commission's findings of fact are not based on any substantial competent evidence; ... or
(4) the findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award. I.C. § 72-732;
Ewins v. Allied Sec., 138 Idaho 343, 345-46, 63 P.3d 469, 471-72 (2003). This Court
exercises free review over the Commission's legal conclusions but does not disturb factual
findings that are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Ewins, 138 Idaho at
346,63 P.3d at 472. "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id
On a motion for reconsideration, it is proper for the Commission to examine the evidence
and determine whether undue weight was given to an expert opinion by the Referee, and whether
that opinion was based on "substantial and competent evidence." Dr. Stephen Munday's opinions
were not based on any medical evidence in the record, but entirely speculative, and contrary to
the opinions of the treating physicians. They were therefore not entitled to any weight.
Claimant's Reply Memorandnm in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 6

Similarly, Dr. Craig Beaver based his opinions on "facts" that were nowhere supported in
the record and in fact refuted. He testified that some of Leisa Knowlton's initial anxiety and
emotional distress were due to occurrences in her life. But the medical reports of her anxiety
preceded any of these occurrences, making it impossible for any of them to be a component of
her initial reports of anxiety.
Moreover, Dr. Beaver's opinions were misstated in Finding #29, which stated:

Finding #29. "Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D .... opined inhalation exposure was not the
predominate cause of Claimant's symptoms initially and was not a probable cause of
her later-appearing symptoms.
Dr. Beaver's opinion did not cover all of Leisa Knowlton's "symptoms," either initially
or later-appearing. His opinion was specifically limited to anxiety and emotional distress. Dr.
Beaver was not qualified to offer a medical opinion as to whether Leisa Knowlton contracted
RADS from her exposure, nor was he qualified to opine on the extent to which she continued to
suffer from the physical symptoms ofRADS. Dr. Beaver did not offer any opinion on those
issues. He only offered the opinion that there was an emotional component to her symptoms that
accounted for "some of her breathing episodes." He testified, "She could have the most clearly
verified physiological reactive airway disease problem where nobody would disagree that she
had that severely, but some of the episodes that she's going to have are triggered by her
emotions. That's just the way that disorder works." Dr. Beaver depo., p. 51, lines 4-11.
Dr. Beaver also made the point that he was not offering an opinion on the number of
breathing episodes that were initiated by anxiety as opposed to those initiated by her medical
condition. He admitted that the breathing episodes could be triggered by Leisa's medical
condition "a lot of the time." He said:
"Well, from her perspective, she always felt that the breathing problem came on first then
she got nervous and anxious about it.
Claimant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideratiou 7

And I'm not saying that couldn't be true some of the time or a lot of the time, but she
really would not acknowledge that it ever was the other way around." Dr. Beaver depo.,
p. 50, line 20 - p. 51 , line 2.
Contrary to Finding #29, Dr. Beaver did not opine on her physical problem at all, or the
extent to which her emotional anxiety or medical condition was the predominate problem. Dr.
Beaver's report offered an opinion only as to "the claimant's current psychological problems,
disorders or conditions." His report stated:
"b. Is the September 12,2000, alleged exposure the predominate cause as compared to all
other causes combined of any consequences of the claimant's current psychological
problems, disorders, or conditions?
This is a complex question. While the 09/12/00 exposure likely contributed to her level of
emotional distress, it occurred within the context of at least three other emotionally
difficult factors. There was the discovery her children were being physically abused by
her former husband and the ensuing custody battle. Additionally, in April 2001, her sister
was killed. Then in September 2006, her brother was killed and she has taken in her 11year old niece to care for. The combination of these factors appear to be the cause of her
current emotional distress as discussed above. Therefore, I do not feel the 09/12/00
alleged exposure is the predominate cause above all other causes of her emotional
distress, but a factor among several other factors that contributed to her current
psychological state." Exh. 31, p. 20.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the substantial competent evidence in this case, the Claimant has met her
burden of proof and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order should be reversed.
Dated: December 8, 2009.

Christ T. TroUPlS
Attorney for Claimant
Leisa Knowlton
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY certify that on December 8, 2009, I caused to serve a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Claimant's Reply Memorandum in support of Motion For Reconsideration in the
above referenced case by first class

u.s.

mail, postage prepaid, and by electronic mail upon the

following:

Matthew Pappas
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
PO Box 7426
Boise,ID 83707-7426

C6;[)l.2Ch~tT.Tro~
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LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant,
v.
WOOD RNER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and
FREMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
and
IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION,
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ORDER DENYING
RECONSIDERATION

FI LED

JAN t ~ 2010
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

On November 20, 2009, Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum
in support, requesting reconsideration of the Industrial Commission's decision filed November 3,
2009, in the above referenced case. Defendants filed a response on December 3, 2009, and
Claimant filed a reply on December 9, 2009.
At hearing, Claimant alleged that while at work she was exposed to an odor for several
hours and suffered injury to her lungs. She has been unable to work around any odor since and
thus, she is totally disabled as an odd lot worker. Defendants contended that Claimant was not
injured by the odor but instead suffers from her longstanding asthma exacerbated by
gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD).
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The Commission's Recommendation and Order found that the opmlOns of treating
physician Dr. Fullmer and expert toxicologist Dr. Munday were consistent with each other, and
established that Claimant's September 12, 2000 exposure did not cause any symptoms or
condition which would have reasonably required medical care. The Commission concluded that
Claimant failed to show that the symptoms for which she sought medical attention probably were
related to the exposure to the odor she experienced on September 12,2000. The Commission did
find Defendants liable for Claimant's initial six-week period of medical benefits as an expense of
investigating the compensability of the claim.
In the motion for reconsideration, Claimant argues that the Commission's decision is not
based on substantial competent evidence, and the findings do not as a matter of law support the
order and award. Defendants aver that Claimant is merely asking the Commission to reweigh the
evidence and come to a different conclusion.
A decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to
all matters adjudicated, provided that within 20 days from the date of the filing of the decision,
any party may move for reconsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718. However, "it is axiomatic that
a claimant must present to the Commission new reasons factually and legally to support a
hearing on her Motion for Rehearing/Reconsideration rather than rehashing evidence previously
presented." Curtis v. M.ll. King Co., 142 Idaho 383,388, 128 P.3d 920 (2005).
On reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evidence in the case, and
determine whether the evidence presented supports the legal conclusions. The Commission is
not compelled to make findings on the facts of the case during reconsideration. Davison v. H.H.
Keirn Co., Ltd., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196. The Commission may reverse its decision upon
a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of the decision in question, based on the arguments
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION - 2

presented, or upon its own motion, provided that it acts within the time frame established in
Idaho Code § 72-718 . See, Dennis v.School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d 329 (2000)
(citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410 (1988)).
A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual
findings and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes issue.

However, the

Commission is not inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration simply
because the case was not resolved in a party's favor.
Claimant contends she contracted reactive airway disease syndrome (RADS) as a result
of her inhalation injury. RADS is a subset or form of asthma related to a toxic irritant exposure.
Claimant argues that she has proven the eight criteria for diagnosing RADS. Claimant points to
facts that support her argument including the testimony of Dr. Carveth, a pulmonologist. While
there is support for the argument, ultimately the Commission was persuaded by the opinions of
treating Dr. Fullmer and Defendants' expert Dr. Munday that Claimant suffered from GERD.
Claimant argues that she proved that her symptoms were related to the exposure on
September 12, 2000 because she had no prior medical evidence establishing asthma or
respiratory problems. While there are not many prior medical records available, Dr. Munday
found that some cases of GERD are not always obvious until they become severe. Based on the
medical evidence presented Drs. Fullmer and Munday diagnosed that Claimant suffers from
GERD instead ofRADS.
The Commission does not dispute that Claimant smelled an odor at work, but the smell
was from an unknown substance blown by a fan from over 15 feet down a hallway. Claimant
concluded that she had inhaled a toxic substance. Claimant's initial treating doctor opined that
Claimant's symptoms were inconsistent with exposure to inhaled sulfuric acid.
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION - 3

Claimant also avers that the evidence does not support the opinions of defense experts.
While the Commission fully acknowledges that there is medical evidence to supports both
parties in this case, the Commission found Dr. Munday's report thorough and his testimony
persuasive. Claimant's initial complaint was for a cough, a burning sensation in her nose, and no
mention of eye irritation. Dr. Munday explained how gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD)
was more consistent given these facts than chemical inhalation and was likely the cause of
Claimant's cough and sensation in her lungs and throat.
The Commission has reviewed the record with a focus on the concerns that Claimant has
raised in the motion for reconsideration and we still feel that the facts support the decision. The
Commission's analysis took into account all the documentary evidence and testimony and found
that the opinions of treating physician Dr. Fullmer and expert toxicologist Dr. Munday were
consistent with each other, and established that Claimant's September 12, 2000 exposure did not
cause any symptoms or condition which would have reasonably required medical care. Although
Claimant disagrees with the Commission's findings and conclusions, the Commission finds the
decision of November 3,2009, is supported by substantial evidence in the record and Claimant
has presented no persuasive argument to disturb the decision.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

I~~ day ofJanuary, 2010.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

R.D. Maynard, Chairman
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION - 4

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

ATTEST:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on
J (j7tJ=.day of January, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING~SIDERATION was served by regular United States
Mail upon each of the following:
R. BRAD MASINGILL
PO BOX 467
WEISER, ID 83672-0467
CHRIST T. TROUPIS
PO BOX 2408
EAGLE, ID 83616
MATTHEW O. PAPPAS
PO BOX 7426
BOISE, ID 83707
sb/cjh
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB No. 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130
P. O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
Telephone (208) 938-5584
Fax (208) 938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com

R. BRAD MASIN GILL, ISB No. 2083
Attorney at Law
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone (208) 414-0665
Fax (208) 414-0490
Email bmasingill@hotmail.com

Attorney for Claimant Lesia Knowlton
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WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
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IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY
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NOTICE OF APPEAL

J)

o

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
FREMONT COMPENSATION INSURANCE COMPANY, AND IDAHO
INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, and their attorneys of record:
1.

The above-named Appellant, Lesia Knowlton, hereby appeals against
the above named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the
decision of the Industrial Commission filed November 3, 2009 and the
Order denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, filed by the
Commission on January 14, 2010.

2.

That the Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,
and the final judgment described in paragraph 1 is an appealable order
under and pursuant to Rules 11 (d) I.A.R.

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Appellant
intends to assert, are as follows:
(a) That the findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations
of the Referee Douglas A. Donohue and the Order entered by the
Commission thereon are not based on substantial competent
evidence.
(b) That the findings do not as a matter of law support the order and
award .
(c) That the Claimant should be awarded all of her attorneys fees and
costs incurred in pursuit of this claim, including attorneys fees and
costs on appeal.
(d) Appellant may assert other issues in addition to the foregoing.

4.

Notice of Appeal

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.
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5.

A reporter's transcript of the hearing held on June 20, 2008 was
prepared in compressed format and filed with the Industrial Commission
on July 15, 2008. No further reporter's transcript is requested.

6.

Appellant request and designate the following documents to be included
in the Agency's Record on Appeal.
(a) The Standard Agency Record of the proceedings, and the following
additional pleadings, documents and records:
(b) All exhibits, pre- and post hearing depositions, briefs of the parties, and
memorandum opinions or decisions of the administrative agency.

7.

I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.
(b) That there is no fee due for preparation of a reporter's transcript.
(c) That the administrative agency has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the agency's record.
(d) That the Appellants' filing fee has been paid;
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20 and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to §671401(1), Idaho Code.

DATED this 2yth day of January, 2010.

BY~
Christ T. Troup s
Attorneys for Appellant
Lesia Knowlton

Notice of Appeal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2ih day of January, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL BY LESIA KNOWLTON to be
served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:
[x]
[]
[]
[]
[]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
Federal Express

Matthew O. Pappas
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP
PO Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707

BY~~
Christ T. Troup
Attorneys for Appellant
Lesia Knowlton

Notice of Appeal
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CERTIFICATION

I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby
CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL
FILED JANUARY 29,2010; THE ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION ENTERED
JANUARY 14, 2010; AND THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER ENTERED
NOVEMBER 3, 2009, RE: LESIA KNOWLTON SUPREME COURT APPEAL, herein,
and the whole thereof.
Dated the

29 TH

day of JANUARY, 2010.
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-- ----BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESIA KNOWLTON,

)
)

- - - Claimant-Appellant,-- -

,-- ) SUPREME COURT NO.

V.

3 7~o _
n

)

WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, Employer,
and FREMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE COMPANY, Surety, and
IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION, Party of Interest,
Defendants Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CERTIF1CATE OF APPEAL
OF LESIA KNOWLTON

--------------------------------~)
Appeal From:

Industrial Commission Chairman R. D. Maynard presiding.

Case Number:

IC 2000-030269

Order Appealed from:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER ENTERED
NOVEMBER 3, 2009; AND ORDER DENYING
RECONSIDERATION ENTERED JANUARY 14,2010

Attorney for Appellant:

CHRIST T. TROUP IS
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616

Attorney for Respondents:

MATTHEW O. PAPPAS
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707

Appealed By:

LESIA KNOWLTON, Claimant

Appealed Against:

WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER, Employer and
FREMONT COMPENSATION INSURANCE COMPANY, Surety
and IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION,
Party of Interest

Notice of Appeal Filed:

JANUARY 28, 2010

Appellate Fee Paid:

$86.00

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OFLESIAKNOWLTON-1

Name of Reporter:

Transcript Requested:

M. DEAN WILLIS, CCR
P.O. Box 1241
Eagle, ID 83616
The entire standard transcript has been requested.
_...The standard transcript has b~en prepared and
is on file with the Industrial Commission.

Dated:

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF LESIA KNOWLTON - 2

ORIGINAL
Anderson, Julian & Hull
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
Alan K. Hull, ISB No.: 1568
Matthew O. Pappas, ISB No. 6190
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Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants
Wood River Medical Center, Fremont Compensation Insurance
Group and Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant/Appellant/CrossRespondent,

I.C. No. 2000-030269
Supreme Court No. 37360

vs.
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL
WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer, and FREMONT
COMPENSATION INSURANCE GROUP,
Surety, and IDAHO INSURANCE
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Party of
Interest,

SUPREME COURT FILING FEE:
$86.00
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FILING
FEE: $100.00

Defendants/Respondents/CrossAppellants.

TO:

THE ABOVE ENTITLED CLAIMANT, LESIA KNOWLTON AND HER
ATTORNEYS, AND THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellants, WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 1

Employer, FREMONT COMPENSATION INSURANCE GROUP, Surety, and IDAHO
INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Party of Interest, appeal against the above
named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the (i) Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation and (ii) Order entered by the Idaho Industrial

Commission on November 3, 2009 and the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the Commission on January 14, 2010.
2.

The party has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and
pursuant to Rules 11 (d), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of issues on appeal:
(a)

Does the Commission have subject matter jurisdiction over the

Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Idaho Code § 41-3601 et seq.?
(b)

Did the Commission err by denying the Motion to Strike Claimant's

Post-Hearing Reply Brief?
(c)

If the commission has subject matter jurisdiction, did it err by

failing to address and follow the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Idaho
Code § 41-3601 et seq. ?
4.

No further transcript other than the transcript of the hearing held on June

20, 2008 is requested.
5.

The Cross-Appellants request the following documents to be included in

the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 2

..... -

those designated by the appellant in the initial notice of appeal:
(a)

All documents identified in the Request for Additional Records on

Appeal filed contemporaneously herewith .
6.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal has been served on the

(b)

That there is no fee due for preparation of a reporter's transcript.

(c)

That the administrative agency has been paid the estimated fee for

report.

preparation of any additional documents requested in the cross-appeal.
(d)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this ""f:;ay of February, 2010.
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP

By:

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 3

CERTIFICATefF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of February, 2010, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL by delivering the same to each
of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:

R. Brad Masingill
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672

[~U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[ 1 Hand-Delivered

[Y

[ 1

Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A.
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Suite 130
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616

[ /U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ 1 Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
[ ]
Facsimile

Industrial Commission
700 South Clearwater Lane
Boise, Idaho 83712

[

Idaho Supreme Court
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0020

v-r

-]~.S.

[ ...-1
[
[

]
]

[~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ .....j

[

]

[ ]

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - 4

Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Anderson, Julian & Hull
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile:
(208) 344-5510
Alan K. Hull, ISB No.: 1568
Matthew O. Pappas, ISB No. 6190
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Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant-Appellant,

I.C. No. 2000-030269

vs.

Supreme Court No. 37360

WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer, and FREMONT
COMPENSATION INSURANCE GROUP,
Surety, and IDAHO INSURANCE
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, Party of
Interest,

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
RECORDS ON APPEAL

Defendants-Respondents.

1.

Agency's Record:
a. Defendants' Exhibits admitted at the October 20, 2005 hearing:
i. Exhibit 1 - Form 1 (DOL: 9/12/00)
ii. Exhibit 2 - Ron Fullmer, M.D.
iii. Exhibit 3 - Hailey Medical Clinic
iv. Exhibit 4 - Melani Harker, M.D.

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON APPEAL - 1

v . Exhibit 5 - Laira Thomas, F.N.P.
vi. Exhibit 6 - Blaine County Chiropractic
vii. Exhibit 7 - Ralph Campanale II , M.D.
viii. Exhibit 8 - F. John Gies, M.D.
ix. Exhibit 9 - Thomas Pryor, M.D.
x. Exhibit 10 - Richard Henry, M .D.
xi. Exhibit 11 - Scott Wright, D.D.S.
xii. Exhibit 12 - Stephen Munday, M.D .
xiii. Exhibit 13 - Magic Valley Regional Medical Center
xiv. Exhibit 14 - Cassia Memorial Hospital
xv. Exhibit 15 - Wood River Medical Center
xvi . Exhibit 16 - Gooding County Memorial Hospital
xvii. Exhibit 17 - University of Utah/Holly Carveth, M.D.
xviii. Exhibit 18 - Social Security Administration Disability File
xix. Exhibit 19 - Claimant's Personnel File
xx. Exhibit 20 - Claimant's Tax Returns
xxi. Exhibit 21 - Claimant's September 23, 2003 Deposition
Transcript
xxii. Exhibit 22 - Claimant's September 28, 2004 Deposition
Transcript
xxiii. Exhibit 23 - Jodi Alverson's March 24, 2005 Deposition
Transcript
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON APPEAL - 2

xxiv. Exhibit 24 - Joyce Fogg's March 24, 2005 Deposition
Transcript
xxv. Exhibit 25 - Karen Exon's March 24, 2005 Deposition
Transcript
xxvi. Exhibit 26 - Robert Morrison's March 24, 2005 Deposition
Transcript
xxvii. Exhibit 27 - MSDS Data Sheet
xxviii. Exhibit 28 - Douglas Crum, CDMS
xxix. Exhibit 29 - Mark Zuvic Deposition Transcript

xxx. Exhibit 30 - William Wallace, M.D.
xxxi. Exhibit 31 - Craig Beaver, Ph.D.
xxxii. Exhibit 32 - Camas County Ambulance Run Reports
xxxiii. Exhibit 33 - Darla Boggs' June 3, 2008 Deposition Transcript
xxxiv. Exhibit 34 - Jenna Rovig's June 9, 2008 Deposition Transcript
b. Transcripts of Post Hearing Depositions of:
i. Holly Carveth, M.D. (8/29/08)
ii. William Wallace, M.D. (2/27/09)
iii. Ronald K. Fullmer, M.D. (3/16/09)
iv. Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D. (4/9109)
v. Doug Crum, CDMS (4/28/09)
c. Claimant's Trial Brief dated June 11, 2009
d. Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief dated June 26, 2009
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON APPEAL - 3

e. Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief dated July 10, 2009
f.

Defendants' Motion to Strike Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief
dated July 10, 2009

g. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation dated
October 16, 2009 and filed November 3, 2009
h. Order dated/filed November 3, 2009
I.

Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support
dated November 19, 2009

j.

Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration dated
December 3, 2009

k. Order Denying Reconsideration dated/filed January 14, 2010

2.

I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the clerk of the
administrative agency and upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.&
DATED this

~ day of February, 2010.
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP

By:
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of December, 2010, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS'/RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIIONAL
RECORDS ON APPEAL by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:

R. Brad Masingill
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Christ T. Troupis
TROUPIS LAW OFFICES, P.A.
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Suite 130
P.O. Box 2408
Eagle, Idaho 83616
Industrial Commission
700 South Clearwater Lane
Boise, Idaho 83712

Idaho Supreme Court
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0020
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]

Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

]

Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
csimile

CERTIFICATION

I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby
CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the NOTICE OF CROSSAPPEAL filed February 8, 2010; and the REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON
APPEAL filed February 8, 2010, RE: LESIA KNOWLTON SUPREME COURT
APPEAL, herein, and the whole thereof.

CERTIFICATION

Christ T. Troupis, ISB No. 4549
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130
P. O. Box 2408
Eagle, ID 83616
Telephone (208) 938-5584
Fax (208) 938-5482
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com
R. BRAD MASINGILL, ISB No. 2083
Attorney at Law
27 W. Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
Telephone (208) 414-0665
Fax (208)414-0490
Email bmasingill@hotmail.com
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Attorney for Claimant Lesia Knowlton

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant,
vs.
WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and
FREMONT COMPENSATION
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Surety,
and
IDAHO INSURANCE GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION,
Party of Interest,
Defendants.

REQUEST FOR ADDmONAL RECORDS
ON APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1

IC 2000-030269
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST
FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS
ON APPEAL
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TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
FREMONT COMPENSATION INSURANCE COMPANY, AND IDAHO
INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, and their attorneys of record:
1.

In her Notice of Appeal, the Appellant, Lesia Knowlton , has requested
that all pre-and post hearing depositions be included in the Agency's
Record on Appeal.

2.

Respondents/Cross-Appellants have designated some of the post
hearing depositions in their Request for Additional records on appeal.

3.

The following post hearing depositions should also be included in the
Agency's Record on Appeal :
a) Barbara K. Nelson, MS, CRC (12/31/08)
b) Shauna Gorringe (6/18/07)
c) Jason Gorringe (6/18/07)
d) Mike Stewart (6/18/07)
e) Barbara Wentzel (6/18/07)
f) Shari Rumple (6/18/07)
g) Connie Jacobson (6/19/07)
h) Frances Hobbs (6/19/07)
i)

Bobbie Hobbs (6/19/07)

j)

Lynn Jacobson (6/19/07)

k) Deanna Hoskinson (6/19/07)
I)

Dawn Ingersoll (6/19/07)

m) Rhonda Henderson (6/19/07)
n) May Heacock (6/19/07)

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS

ON APPEAL
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0) David T. Knowlton (9/17/08)

p) Warren Dan Gorringe (9/17/08)
q) Jay Brown (11/25/08)
4.

I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the clerk of the
administrative agency and upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this 16th day of February, 2010.

BY~
Chrrst T. Trou s
Attorneys for Appellant
Lesia Knowlton

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS
ON APPEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of February, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Supplemental Request for Additional Records on Appeal
to be served upon the following person{s) in the following manner:
[x]
[]
[]
[]
[]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
Federal Express

Matthew O. Pappas
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP
PO Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707

R. Brad Masingill
27 W . Commercial Street
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, ID 83672
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0020

BYCh~~
Attorneys for Appellant
Lesia Knowlton

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS
ON APPEAL

4

CERTIFICATION

I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby
CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the SUPPLEMENTAL
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS ON APPEAL filed February 17, 2010, RE:
LESIA KNOWLTON SUPREME COURT APPEAL, herein, and the whole thereof.

CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD

I, Jan Cottrell, the undersigned Assistant Secretary ofthe Industrial Commission, do hereby
certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and
papers designated to be included in the Clerk's Record on appeal by Rule 28(3) of the Idaho
Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b).
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court after the Record is
settled.

omell
.starlt ·Commt~sibn' Secretary

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD - LEISA J KNOWLTON - 37360-1
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESIA KNOWLTON,
Claimant!Appellant,
v.

WOOD RIVER MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer, and FREMONT
COMPENSATION INSURANCE
COMPANY, Surety, and IDAHO
INSURANCE GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION, Party of Interest
Defendants/Respondents.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 37360

NOTICE OF COMPLETION

Steven Kenyon, Clerk of the Courts; and
Christ T. Troupis for the Appellants; and
Matthew O. Pappas for the Respondent.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and,

pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been served
by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:

CHRIST T TROUPIS
POBOX2408
EAGLE ID 83616-9116
MATTHEW 0 PAPPAS
POBOX7426
BOISE ID 83707

NOTICE OF COMPLETION - LEIS A J KNOWLTON - 37360 - 1
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YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the Clerk's
Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. fu the
event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the twenty-eight
day period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled.
DATED at Boise, Idaho, this

I""

day of March, 2010.

NOTICE OF COMPLETION - LEISA J KNOWLTON - 37360 - 2

